


run 5



THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES GROUP

Issue 10

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
**SCENARIO DESIGN
CONTEST
DETAILS INSIDE !**

Featured in This Issue

- * "Pleasant Hill" - a scenario for the *Decisive Battles Game System*
- * "Back to Bataan" - a scenario for the *Battlefront Game System*
- * *Design Analysis* - a tutorial to simplify scenario design
- * *The American Civil War* - the second part of our historical article

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Roger Keating
Ian Trout
Mark Holman
Phil Niven
David Freer

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
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Run 5

Issue 10
April, 1988

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EDITOR'S CHANCE

This edition has caught up a couple of weeks on the previous one. Sooner or later we're going to get back on schedule. I must apologise for the non-appearance of the *Russia* article and OB in this issue. I'm still working on it and expect to have it ready for Issue 11.

We have another competition starting up. This time it's for *Decisive Battles of the American Civil War* original scenarios and scenario variants. Send in as many entries as you please.

New Releases

Published since the last edition of *Run 5* have been the second volume in the Civil War series and the Apple IIGs version of *Reach for the Stars*. The Amiga version is only a bug away.

Origins '88

From August 18-21, I will be in Milwaukee for the 1988 Origins/GenCon game convention. SSG are being represented by TEVEX this year and I can be found most times at their booth. Please come up and say hello.

I expect to be giving a seminar on SSG's plans for the future as well as participating in a computer game forum being organized by Russell Sipe from Computer Gaming World.

I'll also have with me previews of our Macintosh *Halls of Montezuma*, the Korea and DBACW Vol III releases and our *Battle of the Bulge* game.

Coming Up

Well SSG has finally thrown off the shackles of World War II. In October, we will be releasing a new *Battlefront* game covering the Korean War. No confirmed title as yet, although we are working on it. Expect eight scenarios that will do full justice to the savage conflict in Korea. The developer is Dan Antolec from Monona, Wisconsin.

Also due in October is the third and final volume of our highly successful *Civil War* series. This will cover the last battles of the war. The scenarios will be Spottsylvania, Wilderness, Franklin, Nashville, Atlanta and Cold Harbour.

And now, for all those correspondents wanting a more strategic game from

SSG, a brand new game system! Our *Battle of the Bulge* game will be an operational level game of the fighting in the winter of 1944 in the Ardennes.

Units will be divisional sized with regimental breakdown. Special features will include bridge blowing and repair, sophisticated logistical and replacement rules, artillery and air support. We are very excited about this new system and feel sure that you will like it to.

There are also rumours emerging from Roger's programming cell of a totally new intelligence programming structure, to allow the best possible intelligence system. Watch this space for more details.

Coming Not Quite So Soon

Still under production but not quite imminent are the Mac, IIGS, Amiga and IBM versions of *Halls of Montezuma*. These are expected to come out around Christmas time in roughly the order shown above.

Coming Next Year

Next year will see the Napoleonic game, the conversion of the Civil War system to the 16 bit machines, the greatest computer role-playing game ever made(!), further operational level games and whatever else we can fit in.

Recruitment

Joining the staff in July was Stephen Hart. He comes to us superbly qualified as a practising archeologist, with immense personal experience in both digging holes and directing others to do the same. His job, apart from any ancient warfare simulations or oil explorations, will be to help produce this magazine. He is also working on a game about the colonization and exploration of the new world.

Still Available

Don't forget the *Reach for the Stars* upgrade for all those owners of the Second Edition, details are found in the Q Store section. ♦

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

A mixed bag of letters this time. I have included several which request additional features in some of our games. Well, the more things change...

Dear Roger and Ian,

Russia is topnotch! The scope, flexibility and component quality are excellent. I purchased it after reading a review on it by Evan Brooks in *Computer Gaming World*. Evan's review was "right on" regarding both its good and bad points. However, I think he should have raved a bit more.

If you ever plan to release a Version 2.0 of *Russia*, please consider the following for us gamers in out-of-the-way places who may want to play by mail:

1. Request at start of game if this is a PBM game. If Yes, then have routine to auto-save last combat phase replay to save disk for opponent to review the action. Otherwise only one player ever sees the combat.
2. Password the access to Axis and Soviet orders to prevent spying in two-player and PBM games.
3. Allow choice of enemy target by friendly assaulting unit. Many times I would have liked to change the target from one unit to another to concentrate attacking force.
4. Allow choice of any hex (within usual 7 range) for Main Effort Target to allow encirclements and flanking. These hexes should also be able to act as Army HQ's and "created" supply points, with somewhat less capability than rail supplied cities but more than the normal "by road" supply line from korps to Army HQ in city.
5. Allow choice of Deploy or Contact. The first would deploy without any enemy contact, the second would try to deploy in contact with enemy or as close to enemy as 2 hex limit (from HQ) would allow.
6. Make available a large 24" x 36" full color map of the same quality as your little ones at an additional cost. This would be for those of us who like to cover wall maps in plastic and keep track of moves with erasable color marker pens.

7. Allow a Map Walk choice in the Doctrine/Orders menu.

8. Provide an on-screen color overview map to get the strategic "big picture" with no details beyond terrain (e.g. rivers, forests, cities, etc.) and color and location of friendly/enemy units.

9. Allow player at game start to set the rates that new supply lines can be set up to put captured cities "in supply".

10. Have on-line estimate calculated by program of how long it should take for an indicated target city/hex to become a supplied city. Also how long it will take in turns for an Army to get "re-charged" from its present location and state.

11. In the middle of a game OKH or Stavka should be able to reallocate control of a border city from one Army Group/Theatre to another.

The following are some things in addition to Evan's comments that I still find very difficult to comprehend about *Russia*, despite many times going over the manual backwards and forwards with a fine-tooth comb:

I do not know why it takes varying lengths of time in turns to make a newly captured city a supplied city when replayed under the same circumstances. I have waited for turn after turn with good communications, weather etc. but to no avail. Granted, there may be some need for randomness involved but some more specific guidelines would certainly help in planning attacks.

I do not know why some new army HQ's suddenly appear with no korps in them part way through a game.

I do not know how, when and why some units like SS units suddenly appear? The replacements and reinforcements aspects and effects are still a fog to me.

The specific effects of air and ground support points in various modes of combat are not at all clear. Some combat tables would be most helpful.

I have not found the invasion surprise flag yet.

When in player control of OKH I have had armies reassigned to other Army Groups with no reason.

Thank you for this opportunity to provide input to your game design and I hope you produce many more successes like *Russia*.

Have you ever considered making a tactical squad level game which would allow all us "over-the-hill" Squad Leader fans to utilize our many, many Scenarios in FTF or PBM games? No one has done it yet and I think there is a real market there if it is done "right".

Please do not bother to answer this letter; use the time on Version 2.0 of *Russia* or on your next game. I understand completely the pressures of time.

Gary Chappell

Prince Albert, Sask.

CANADA

(There will be a detailed article on Russia in the next issue. Ed.)

Dear Sirs,

As a recent purchaser of *Europe Ablaze* and subscriber to *Run 5*, I wish to congratulate all of you on your outstanding products. I first came into contact with your products when I bought a copy of *Carriers at War* second-hand (the previous owner having sold his C64 to go IBM). Having spent many hours sweating over a keyboard awaiting the outcome of my strikes, I decided to take the plunge and buy *Europe Ablaze*. Now I'm totally hooked!

Having lavished you with praise, may I now be cheeky enough to make a few suggestions. Coming in late to join the bandwagon, I was too late to enter the EA or CAW design competitions (and I doubt if I'm good enough yet anyway!). However, as an RAAF Officer and keen military historian, I enjoy the hypothetical possibilities made available by the design kit. My particular interest at the moment is a scenario designed for prior to May 10th 1940, to see how the Germans would have fared had the Allies held, or if Germany had tried a

Continued on p.12

THE Q STORE

RUN 5

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RUN 5

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Plus \$AUD 2.00 surface shipping (max.) or \$AUD 4.50 air shipping (max.)

REACH FOR THE STARS UPGRADE

At last, *Reach for the Stars* (3rd Ed.) is completed. If you own a second edition copy of the game, you can upgrade it to third edition (**Apple II or C64 version**). Issue 8 contains a strategy article on the new RFTS. You must enclose the front page of the second edition rulebook and the original disk to be eligible for the upgrade.

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THE BATTLE OF PLEASANT HILL

9th April, 1864

A Scenario for the *Decisive Battles System*

by Ian Trout

The Red River Campaign, undertaken in the early months of 1864, had the distinction, if unwanted, of being the only Union offensive of that year to be completely repulsed. The Confederate victory was all the more remarkable given the disparity of forces, the presence of a Union gunboat flotilla and that the most important battle of the campaign, Pleasant Hill, resulted in a tactical Union success.

Confederate leadership in the west, by and large, was inferior to the foe. In this one campaign, however, General Richard Taylor deserves the lion's share of the credit for the routing of Maj-Gen. Nathaniel Banks' assorted forces.

The Red River Campaign had its beginnings nine months prior to the fateful expedition of March, 1864. The fall of Port Hudson in July 1863 cleared the lower Mississippi, freeing the forces of the newly created Department of the Gulf for fresh employment. General

Grant and Admiral Farragut, as well as Banks himself, all favoured an expedition against Mobile as being the most effective means of lending support to the proposed operations against Chattanooga, at that time the major objective of Union forces in the west.




Washington saw things differently. General Halleck, possibly at Lincoln's insistence, directed Banks to employ his troops against Texas. There were political as well as military considerations behind this order. Much importance was attached to re-establishing

the flag west of the Mississippi.

In September 1863, a surprise invasion of Sabine Pass resulted in immediate and costly failure. A second attempt to reach the Sabine River, this time overland, was called off because of the expected difficulty of supplying troops in such inhospitable country.

Undismayed, Banks resorted once more to naval operations. Between November and December, Brownsville, Corpus Christi and Fort Esperanza were occupied (see accompanying map). The only major port in Texas in Confederate hands at the beginning of 1864 was Galveston and Banks began moving against it early in January.

The operation had barely started when Halleck directed Banks to resume the delayed Red River operation against Shreveport. The 1864 expedition was to be on a larger scale with Banks receiving assistance from Steele's forces in Arkansas, Sherman's forces in Mississippi and a gunboat detachment from Farragut under the command of Admiral Porter.



Commanders at Pleasant Hill

From left to right Taylor (CSA), Polignac (CSA), Mower (USA) and Banks (USA)

The Red River is not generally navigable above Alexandria except when swollen by spring rains for a few weeks in late March and April. With this in mind, it was planned that the operation should get underway by the middle of March. From the outset, the Union plan was seriously flawed. Ten thousand troops from Sherman's command were to be transported by Porter's gunboats to Alexandria where they would link up with Banks' 17,000 men; the intended

rendezvous was 100 miles behind enemy lines! Furthermore, the subsequent junction with Steele's 15,000 troops would occur at Shreveport, another 150 miles into Confederate territory. The accompanying map shows the direction of Banks' march. Even the most elementary military prudence should have warned against such a potentially dangerous plan. Banks' own assessment of the operation specifically argued against this

kind of piecemeal employment, to say nothing of the vague command structure and inadequate provision for reliable resupply. Unable to convince his superiors of the dangers ahead, Banks resolved to carry out his orders as best he could.

Confederate General Kirby Smith, in command of the Department of the Trans-Mississippi which placed him in charge of virtually all rebel forces west of the Mississippi River, could muster about 25,000 men to oppose the Union advance. The field commander for the Confederate forces was General Richard Taylor, son of former President Zach Taylor.

Porter's gunboats, transporting Sherman's troops under the command of Major-General A. J. Smith, were the first to arrive, on the 18th, at Alexandria. Banks' troops arrived a week later. On the 27th, Banks received new orders from Grant. The campaign against Shreveport must be successfully resolved by April 25th; in early May all troops would be needed for the operations against Atlanta and Mobile.

Banks considered abandoning the campaign. Yet the possibility that Kirby Smith would not be able to concentrate his troops in time as well as the chance that the Confederates would choose not to defend Shreveport encouraged him to continue the fight.

By April 3rd, the Red River had risen enough to permit Banks' transports and thirteen of the smaller gun-boats to pass the rapids above Alexandria. The Confederate forces immediately confronting them were gathered at a plantation about 40 miles north-west of Alexandria. Taylor still awaited the arrival of reinforcements from Price's army, a total of two divisions under the command of Thomas Churchill.

On the 6th Banks' army, now about 24,000 strong (some 5,000 men had been told off for rear area security) set out overland toward Mansfield. They found Taylor with about 16,000 men skilfully deployed on the edge of a small clearing about 2 miles south of Mansfield. It wasn't until late in the afternoon, about 4 pm, that battle proper was joined.

The Union troops were sent forward with inadequate flank support, and combined with some poor tactical deci-



The Department of the Trans-Mississippi
(otherwise known as Kirby-Smithdom)

PLEASANT HILL - Map




TERRAIN KEY

	OPEN		WOODS		HILL		WOODED HILL
	HAMLET		GULLY		ROAD		HIDDEN ROAD
	RIVER		BRIDGE (ROAD)		BRIDGE (OTHER)		

PLEASANT HILL - Terrain Effects Chart

TERRAIN TYPE #	T0-T31	T3	T4	T5	T6	T7	T8
TERRAIN NAME	[11]	Open	Woods	Hill	Wooded Hill	Hamlet	Gully
SIGHTING VALUE	0-7	0	5	3	7	2	3
MOVEMENT COST	0-7	2	4	3	5	2	3
COVER VALUE	0-7	1	3	3	5	2	2
FORT. (NORTH)	0-7	0	0	0	0	0	3
FORT. (SOUTH)	0-7	0	0	0	0	0	0



The Red River Campaign

Banks' Operations in Louisiana (March-April, 1864)

sions, put to flight after two hours of tough fighting. First Landram's division, then Cameron's, from XIII Corps, disintegrated under the assault of Taylor's best troops, the three brigades of Alfred Mouton's Louisiana division. Only the timely arrival of Emory's division from XIX Corps saved the Union forces from complete disaster.

On the advice of his subordinates, Banks withdrew that night to the little township of Pleasant Hill, about 9 miles to the south-east. Emory's division deployed in front of the township while A. J. Smith's fresh troops formed a second line and a reserve. The dispirited XIII Corps troops under the command of Maj-General Ransom were

sent to the rear to guard the wagons and took no part in the impending battle.

Taylor was determined to complete the destruction of the Union Army. His tired troops were on the road early and by 1 pm had reached Pleasant Hill. For two hours the Confederate's rested while Taylor prepared a plan of attack. Churchill's two divisions, unused the previous day but nonetheless very tired from two days of continuous marching, deployed on the right flank with orders to assault the Union left and hopefully uncover it. Walker's and Mouton's divisions, the latter now commanded by Prince Camille de Polignac following upon Mouton's demise, deployed in the centre with orders to pin their opponents. Green's cavalry were to move around the Union right and put themselves in position to cut off Banks' expected retreat.

It is at this point that the Pleasant Hill scenario begins.

CREATING THE SCENARIO

If this is the first time you have tried to transfer a magazine scenario onto a save-game disk, we recommend you follow these directions. The letters in parentheses after each heading refer to the corresponding section in the *Decisive Battles* manual.

Preparing the Disk [3]. Boot up the Master Disk and select <CREATE> from Menu H. Select <SCENARIO> from Menu B. <LOAD> any historical scenario. You have been processed through to Menu J. Select the <DISK> line from that menu.

If you have one disk drive, remove the Master Disk and replace it with a blank disk. If you have two drives, remove the Scenario Disk from the second drive and replace it with a blank disk.

Select <FORMAT> from the on-screen menu. Once this is done, select <SAVE> from the menu and store any of the historical scenarios in any unused save-game location. This procedure prepares the template on which we will build the Pleasant Hill scenario.

The Warplan™ menus are displayed on the back of the game menus card. Refer to this when necessary.

Title [5c]. There are three lines of text for the title.

PLEASANT HILL - Brigades

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
UNIT ID	[3]	Gri	Gau	Cla	Bur	Wau	Ran	Scu	Gra	Sto	Bee	Maj	Bag	Art
MAP LOC	(x,y)	5,5	5,6	6,7	6,6	4,4	4,3	5,4	12,0	2,0	4,1	6,0	7,8	5,1
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
DIVISION	0-39	1	1	2	2	3	3	3	4	4	0	0	0	0
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1(0)	1(0)	0	1	0	0
TYPE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	3
OBJECTIVE	0-23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	5	0
SMALL ARMS	0-31	8	12	8	12	1	1	1	1	12	9	8	2	0
ARTILLERY	0-31	18	17	0	0	18	0	18	21	18	0	0	0	21
TROOP STREN.	0-31	12	9	7	16	11	11	11	9(14)	8(15)	9	8	10	4
MOVEMENT	0-15	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	12	8	8	5
BATTERY STR.	0-15	2	2	0	0	1	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	8
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	2	3	4	1	6	4	3	5	4	3	4	2	3
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	4(7)	4(7)	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4(6)	4(6)	5	5	4	4
REGIMENTS	0-7	5	4	2	5	4	5	4	5	4	2	4	5	1
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	4(7)	4(7)	7	5	7	7

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	(48)	(49)	(50)	(51)	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60
UNIT ID	[3]	Flo	Ray	Eme	Van	Hub	Hil	Lyn	Sha	Moo	Dwi	McM	Ben	Luc
MAP LOC	(x,y)	17,3	17,3	17,3	17,3	12,4	12,6	12,7	7,2	12,5	9,1	10,3	9,5	15,4
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0
DIVISION	0-39	22	22	23	23	20	20	20	0	20	21	21	21	0
ARRIVAL	0-95	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1
TYPE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
OBJECTIVE	0-23	6	6	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
SMALL ARMS	0-31	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9
ARTILLERY	0-31	18	17	21	21	17	21	21	21	0	17	17	17	0
TROOP STREN.	0-31	14	11	10	11	12	11	14	16	9	25	17	18	11
MOVEMENT	0-15	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	12
BATTERY STR.	0-15	2	2	3	2	2	3	3	2	0	1	1	1	0
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	2	3	0	2	4	3	5	4	4	3	5	4	2
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	4	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	3	2	3	3	5	5	7	5	4	2	3	2	3
REGIMENTS	0-7	5	4	4	4	3	2	3	4	2	5	4	4	3
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	6	7	7	7	4

PLEASANT HILL - Divisions

DIV NUMBER	1-39	1	2	3	4	20	21	(22)	(23)
DIVISION ID	[9]	Tappan	Parsons	Walker	Polignac	Mower	Emory	Cameron	Landram
CORPS	0-15	1	1	0	0	8	9	10	10
TYPE	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ORDERS	0-2	0	0	0	2(0)	1	2	0	0
OBJECTIVE #1	0-23	5	5	4	0(4)	6	0	6	6
OBJECTIVE #1	0-23	6	6	6	0(6)	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	3	2	5	6	4	3	3	1
STAFF	0-7	3	3	5	4	4	4	3	3

PLEASANT HILL - Objectives

OBJECTIVE NUM.	1-23	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
OBJECTIVE NAME	[11]	The Bridge	Sabine Rd	The Ford	The Cl'ring	The Gully	Pleas' Hill	To G. Ecore	To Blairs L.
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	4,1	3,7	5,4	7,2	9,5	10,4	15,8	17,3
START TURN (N)	1-95	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
STOP TURN (N)	1-95	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
VPs/TURN (N)	0-255	3	3	5	1	1	5	0	0
VPs AT END (N)	0-255	25	25	15	10	10	10	2	2
MAN. VALUE (N)	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
START TURN (S)	1-95	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
STOP TURN (S)	1-95	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
VPs/TURN (S)	0-255	0	0	0	2	2	5	5	5
VPs AT END (S)	0-255	1	1	2	2	2	20	25	25
MAN. VALUE (S)	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Pleasant Hill Stalemate on the Red River April 9th, 1864

Do not change the command names. Go back to Menu J and re-save the game in the same location.

Map Size [5a(i)]. The top left sector is 0. The bottom right sector is 1.

Define Terrain [5a(ii)]. The accompanying Terrain Effects Chart lists the details of the active terrain types for this scenario. Select the icons of your choice to represent the six terrain types.

Create Map [5a(iii)]. Select the <CLEAR> line from Menu J. Clear only the map. Do not clear the data. Use the accompanying map to build up the screen map. Do not forget to assign

control to each hex. All hexes to the left of, and including, the following hexes are under Confederate control. All other hexes are under Union control. (The hexes are 7,0; 6,1; 5,1; 5,2; 5,3; 6,4; 6,5; 7,5; 7,6; 7,7; 7,8.) The map shows which roads should be entered as hidden (sunken) roads. Where roads run through town hexes, make those roads into hidden roads; it looks better if you do.

Save the game again. How often you save really depends on how lucky you feel. After several major disasters, I choose to save after each section is completed.

Limits [5b(i)]. Before you can set the force limits, you must go through all the Union units in the data base and clear them. The force limits are as follows; corps (8), divisions (20), brigades (48). There are not that many Rebel

units of course; what we have done is make room for additional Rebel units if we want to enlarge the scenario.

Do not change the weapons limits or weapon types data bases.

Forces [5b(iii)]. Edit the North Army HQ as follows; (Banks) (-) (Army of) (the Gulf) (10,4) (0) (0) (0) (6) (0) (4) (2) (2) (1). Edit the South Army HQ as follows; (Taylor) (-) (Army of the) (Trans-Miss) (4,2) (0) (6) (7) (0) (0) (9) (5) (1) (6).

There are two North corps. In the '8' slot enter (Smith), (13,5) (0) (1) (0) (4) (1) (9) (1*) (5) (4) (1) (6). In the '9' slot enter (Franklin), (9,3) (0) (0) (1) (6) (0) (9) (0*) (3) (4) (1) (7). A third North corps is available for the early start variant as explained in the variant section.

There is one South corps. In the '1' slot enter (Churchill), (4,7) (0) (0) (0) (5) (6) (9) (0*) (3) (3) (1) (7). The (*) refers to the

PLEASANT HILL UNION FORCES

Army of the Gulf

Maj-Gen N. P. Banks

Independent Cavalry Brigade

Lucas' Brigade (Luc; 1,100 men, no guns)

Smith's Corps (XVI Corps)

Mower's Division

Hubbard's Brigade (Hub; 1,200 men, 4 guns), Hill's Brigade (Hil; 1,100 men, 6 guns), Lynch's Brigade (Lyn; 1,400 men, 6 guns), Moore's Brigade (Moo; 900 men, no guns)

Franklin's Corps (XIX Corps)

Emory's Division

Dwight's Brigade (Dwi; 2,500 men, 2 guns), McMillan's Brigade (McM; 1,700 men, 2 guns), Benedict's Brigade (Ben; 1,800 men, 2 guns)

Independent Brigade

Shaw's Brigade (Sha; 1,600 men, 4 guns)

(OPTIONAL)

Ransom's Corps (XIII Corps)

Cameron's Division

Flory's Brigade (Flo; 1,400 men, 4 guns), Raynor's Brigade (Ray; 1,100 men, 4 guns)

Landram's Division

Emerson's Brigade (Eme; 1,000 men, 6 guns), Vance's Brigade (Van; 1,100 men, 4 guns)

Daily Commitment variable introduced in Volume II. If you are creating this scenario with the Volume I master disk, then simply ignore the value.

There are 2 North and 4 South divisions. Two additional divisions are available to the North with the early

PLEASANT HILL CONFEDERATE FORCES

Army of the Trans- Mississippi

Maj-Gen R. Taylor

Artillery Reserve

(Art; 400 men, 16 guns)

Independent Brigades

Bee's Cavalry Brigade (Bee; 900 men, no guns), Major's Brigade (Maj; 800 men, no guns)

Walker's Division

Waul's Brigade (Wau; 1,100 men, 2 guns), Randal's Brigade (Ran; 1,100 men, no guns), Scurry's Brigade (Scu; 1,100 men, 2 guns)

Polignac's Division

Gray's Brigade (Gra; 900 men, 4 guns), Stone's Brigade (Sto; 800 men, 4 guns)

Churchill's Corps

Tappan's Division

Grinstead's Brigade (Gri; 700 men, no guns), Gause's Brigade (Gau; 900 men, 4 guns)

Parsons' Division

Clark's Brigade (Cla; 1,200 men, 4 guns), Burn's Brigade (Bur; 1,600 men, no guns)

Independent Brigade

Bagby's Brigade (Bag; 1,000 men, no guns)

start variant. They are identified in the accompanying tables by the parentheses around the division number. There is a second set of values for some of the variables in Polignac's division. These are also used in the early start variant.

There are 9 North and 13 South brigades. Four additional brigades are available to the North with the early start variant. They are identified in the accompanying tables by the parenthe-

ses around the brigade number. There is a second set of values for some of the variables in the brigades of Gray and Stone. These are also used in the early start variant.

Objectives [5b(iv)]. Enter the data from the accompanying table.

Scenario Setup [5d(i)]. Enter the following data; Date (9), Month (4), Year (64), Century (18), North Maximum Hex Movement is (5,0,7,0,7), South Maximum Hex Movement is (5,0,7,3,7), neither side is encamped (or entrenched*) and VP awards are 20 per leader and 2 per 100 men. Again the (*) refers to a variable introduced with Volume II. Ignore it if you're using the Volume I master disk.

Scenario Details [5d(ii)]. For Day 1 the weather is clear, the North is Defensive (0), the South is Offensive (1), 4pm to 7pm are daylight (3), move (1) turns and 8pm is a dusk (0), end (2) turn.

Finally, save again and the scenario is ready to play.

PLAYER NOTES

Taylor's historical plan of attack called for a pinning action by Walker's men while Churchill's troops, deployed on the right flank, were to drive against the Federal left and hopefully unpin the entire enemy position. As things turned out, Churchill's line of assault did not go deep enough with the result that his left flank was exposed in turn to the Union reserve; three brigades under Major-General Mower. The Confederate player must take care that this does not happen to him.

Churchill's men are not very good so be warned not to expect too much from them. Walker's men are better and can make good progress against the Union centre, at least until Mower's reserve arrives. Polignac's exhausted, depleted troops may join the fray for the final turns.

There are just 5 turns in the historical scenario so there is no time for delay. To win you will need to capture the Pleasant Hill hamlet or inflict serious loss on Banks' army.

The Union player begins with Mower's reserve out of action until the second or third turn. The brigade in the gully may hold out this long; if it does, reinforce it and keep the Rebs away from Pleasant

Hill. Lucas' cavalry brigade is unlikely to become available so don't count on it. In the final turns, withdraw exposed brigades to keep losses down.

VARIANTS

1. By the time the Confederate troops had moved into position to attack the Federal line, it was almost 4 pm. If we assume that the Battle of Mansfield on the previous day had not taken place, then we can begin this battle much earlier in the day.

Make the following changes. Add Ransom's Corps. In the '10' slot enter (Ransom) (17,4) (0) (1) (0) (6) (0) (9) (0) (2) (3) (2) (5). Add Cameron's and Landram's divisions as detailed in the division table. Add Flory's, Raynor's, Emerson's and Vance's brigades as detailed in the brigade table.

Make the parenthesized changes to Polignac's division as detailed in the division table. Make the parenthesized changes to Gray's and Stone's brigades as detailed in the brigade table. Extend the end turn number of all objectives to 12. Add turns 11am to 3pm as daylight (3), move (1) turns.

2. Some very interesting variants to this scenario can be created by playing around with the likelihood values of certain units. Experiment for yourselves. In the final two variant slots on the subscription disks, certain changes have been made to the likelihood variables which will make for exciting battles.

Continued from p.3

strategic bombing campaign prior to blitzkrieg. Generally though, any "what if?" type of scenario is the type of thing that I enjoy, and am most interested in from a design viewpoint.

My point is, have you, or would you, consider publishing in *Run 5* the contact addresses and interests of people such as myself who dabble in designing scenarios? This would allow people to see if anyone else is working along the

Continued on p. 23

RFTS Errata

There are now five different *Reach for the Stars (3rd Ed.)* titles released; Apple II family, Commodore 64, Macintosh, IBM and Apple IIGS. This will bring you up to date with any known problems in these games.

Mac (V3.0)

In the basic game only, both PDBs and garrisons on conquered planets should be limited to a maximum of fifty, but are not. It is up to you whether you observe these limits.

In the advanced game, if a player owns no stars whatsoever then he has no navigation range and no valid destinations for ships. In the Mac version ships in that situation always manage to retreat in combat, instead of being stuck where they are. Just remember, they can run but they can't hide.

IBM (V3.0, V3.01) and Apple IIGS (V3.0)

There are some structural problems with saved Global Resource Points. In IBM V3.0 saved RPs over 32,767 go negative, causing all future production to be lost. On IBM V3.01 and IIGS V3.0 Global RPs are limited to 32,000 and 64,000 respectively, and will not increase beyond that level. In any case, if you can afford not spend such vast sums on warships, you must already have won the game.

IBM

If a task force is at a star system with more than one valid planet as a target, the attacking routines form only one TF. To change its destination move the cursor to the destination field and use the window's Next Planet command or type the planet number directly into the destination field. To have multiple attacks on the same turn use the New TF command and transfer ships out of the existing TF. The destination of the new TF can be adjusted in the same way. This is not mentioned in the printed manual, but is included in the Readme file on the distribution disk.

IBM V3.0

Setting any movement cost to one will eventually cause a "divide by zero" error. Any other movement rate is fine.

Apple II Family and C-64/128

Just to set the record straight. Human Nav ranges are 3,4,5, and 7 at the respective navigation Technology Levels. Computer Nav ranges are 3,5,6, and 7.

There can be a small targeting problem when using the <TO THIS STAR> routine to assign TFs. The problem only occurs when you allocate some of the ships at the system.

If you are going to change the rules option (i.e. select or de-select the advanced rules option) do it before making any changes to movement or production costs, otherwise such changes may be lost.

BACK TO BATAAN

Homma's Assault on Luzon

22nd - 29th December, 1941

A Scenario for the Battlefront Game System

by Ian Trout

On December 22nd, 1941 advance elements from the Imperial Japanese Army's 48th Division came ashore at the northern end of Lingayen Gulf, establishing a base of operations barely one hundred miles north of the Philippines capital, Manila.

Within a week they had smashed the Filipino defenders, driving them back to prepared positions in the Bataan Peninsula and had opened the road to Manila. It was a crushing defeat, the first ever suffered by the US outside America.

Yet, if comparisons are to be made, the mostly raw Filipinos performed no worse than their regular British Army counterparts in Malaya; and Britain had been at war for two years!

Throughout the 1930s, American policy for the defence of their Pacific interests was continually undermined by a congress unwilling, and sometimes unable, to find the funds for its implementation. In both diplomatic and military circles, few senior executives were prepared to accept Japan, or any non-Caucasian race for that matter, as a serious military threat. The general opinion was that the Oriental just couldn't stand up to the white man. Events would prove this opinion to be very foolish.

General Douglas MacArthur became the senior military adviser to the Philippines in 1935. More accurately, his position was as its *de facto* military commander. He drew up grandiose plans for a self-sufficient, local defence force which would supposedly reach maturity in 1946-7. Very little was actually accomplished, except for the induction of a large number of Filipinos into an army which had neither the leadership or equipment to accommodate them.

Rather than abandon his plans and attempt to achieve something in the realm of reality rather than fantasy, MacArthur used most of his energy to lobby for more appropriations. They didn't come.

Equipment

0	
1	Rifle
2	Hvy Weap
3	50mm Mor
4	Assault
5	70mm Mtn
6	75mm Gun
7	Type 97s
8	Scouts
9	155mm CA
10	M2A4s

Throughout 1941, as the likelihood of war became more and more certain, more and more Filipinos were drafted. The American naval presence was reduced to a token force, except for 21 modern submarines which were supposed to threaten and harass Japanese maritime operations.

The air force was reinforced with some modern fighters as well a squadron of the redoubtable B-17 bombers. However, only one American division, the Philippines Division, was available for the defence.

In the first few days of the war, the American air forces and their poorly equipped Filipino compatriots were virtually annihilated. Japanese landings followed shortly thereafter, on the 10th at Aparri, Laoag and Vigan, all at the northern end of Luzon and on the 12th at Legaspi in the southern tip of the island. These were small scale affairs, intended primarily to establish forward air bases for the impending campaign.

A false alarm (nonetheless reported in the press as a major US victory with 10 Japanese warships sunk) on the night of Dec 19th in Lingayen Gulf marked the start of the Japanese invasion. Three days later the first troops came ashore to face elements of the 11th and 71st Divisions of the Philippines Army. Resistance was brief and nor did the

commitment of the 21st Filipino Division help matters much. The arrival of Filipino regulars in the form of the scouts of the 26th Regiment did stall the Japanese temporarily.

By the 26th, the Japanese had reached Camiling and San Quintin. They faced mere remnants from the 11th, 21st and 71st Divisions as well as most of the 91st Filipino Division, now released from reserve. General Wainwright, in command of the Filipino forces, managed to more or less successfully withdraw his troops to a planned defensive line running through Cabanatuan while Homma paused to reorganize his dispersed formations.

Two days later a final withdrawal to Bataan was ordered.

CREATING THE SCENARIO

If this is the first time you have tried to transfer a magazine scenario onto a save-game disk, we recommend you follow these directions. The letters in parentheses after each heading refer to the corresponding section in any of the *Battlefront Game System* manuals.

Preparing the Disk [3]. Boot up the Master Disk and select <CREATE> from Menu H. Select <SCENARIO> from Menu B. <LOAD> any historical scenario. You have been processed through to Menu J. Select the <DISK> line from that menu.

If you have one disk drive, remove the Master Disk and replace it with a blank disk. If you have two disk drives, remove the Scenario Disk from the sec-

ond drive and replace it with a blank disk.

Select <FORMAT> from the on-screen menu. Once this is done, select <SAVE> from the menu and store the scenario in any unused save-game location. Select <CLEAR> from Menu J and erase both map and data. Save again in the same location. This procedure prepares the template on which we will build the Back to Bataan scenario.

The Warplan™ menus are displayed on the back of the game menus card. Refer to this when necessary.

If possible, we recommend you prepare this scenario with either the *Halls of Montezuma* or *Rommel* master disks. If you are using the earlier *Battlefront* or *Battles in Normandy* master disks then a few variables will have to be omitted. These are noted in the text.

Corps Details [5.31]. Enter the data shown on page 20. Ignore the Century, Climate, Brittleness and Night Capable variables unless using the *HOM/ROM* master disk.













Scenario Details [5.32]. Enter the data shown on page 20.

Map Size [5.11]. Enter the data shown on page 21.

Define Terrain [5.12]. Enter the data shown on page 20 in the Terrain Effects Chart. If you are using the *HOM/ROM* master disk, you can use WarPaint™ to create customised terrain icons if you prefer.


Continued on p.23

Terrain Key

	OCEAN		SAVANAH		ROUGH
	MOUNTAIN		WOODS		SWAMP
	AIRFIELD		ROAD		RIVER
	BRIDGE		FORD		TOWN

BACK TO BATAAN - Map






HEADQUARTERS DATA

FORMATION		XX HQ	1/RHQ	2/RHQ	3/RHQ	4/RHQ
HQ I.D.	[8]	11&71 PA	1/11th	2/11th	1/71st	2/71st
UNIT TYPE	[8]	Infantry	Infantry	Militia	Infantry	Militia
HQ ADMIN	0-7	3	3	1	3	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	2	3	3	2	2
HQ SUPPLY	0-7	4	5	3	4	3
BRITTLE	0-1	0	0	1	0	1
MOVEMENT	0-31	6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
ARRIVAL	0-99	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
LOCATION	(x,y)	8,14	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

BATTALION DATA

FORMATION	II/III	1/1	2/1	3/1	4/1	1/2	2/2	3/2	4/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	1/4	2/4	3/4	4/4	1/-	2/-	3/-	4/-
UNIT I.D.	[3]	1	2	3		1	2			1	2	3		1	2			11	71	26	CA
LOCATION	(x,y)	7,8	7,7	8,8		10,8	11,9			11,4	10,2	12,4		13,5	14,6			9,9	14,9	13,2	7,6
CLASS	0-13	0	0	0		0	0			0	0	0		0	0			13	13	5	13
MODE	0-3	0	0	0		0	0			0	0	0		0	0			0	0	0	0
EQUIPM'T	0-31	1	1	1		1	1			1	1	1		1	1			6	6	8	8
MOVEMENT	0-31	7	7	7		6	6			7	7	7		6	6			5	5	10	0
ARRIVAL	0-99	0	0	0		0	0			0	0	0		0	0			0	0	0	0
MAX STREN.	0-15	12	12	12		12	12			12	12	12		12	12			3	3	15	3
INIT. STREN.	0-15	8	9	10		7	6			10	9	10		5	8			3	3	13	3
RATING	0-15	3	3	3		2	2			3	3	3		2	2			6	6	9	6
RANGE	0-15	0	0	0		0	0			0	0	0		0	0			6	6	0	5
FATIGUE	0-7	7	7	7		7	7			7	7	7		7	7			7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	3	3	3		1	1			3	3	3		1	1			2	2	4	3
ATTACHM'T	0-4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	3	3	1




HEADQUARTERS DATA

FORMATION		XX HQ	1/RHQ	2/RHQ	3/RHQ	4/RHQ
HQ I.D.	[8]	21st PA	1/21st	2/21st	3/21st	
UNIT TYPE	[8]	Infantry	Infantry	Militia	Militia	
HQ ADMIN	0-7	2	3	1	2	
LEADERSHIP	0-7	2	4	2	0	
HQ SUPPLY	0-7	4	5	3	3	
BRITTLE	0-1	1	0	1	1	
MOVEMENT	0-31	6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
ARRIVAL	0-99	10	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
LOCATION	(x,y)	2,7	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

BATTALION DATA

FORMATION	II/III	1/1	2/1	3/1	4/1	1/2	2/2	3/2	4/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	1/4	2/4	3/4	4/4	1/-	2/-	3/-	4/-
UNIT I.D.	[3]	1	2	3		1	2			1	2							Art	Eng		
LOCATION	(x,y)	6,7	6,8	7,7		0,5	0,5			1,5	2,6							4,10	4,9		
CLASS	0-13	0	0	0		0	0			0	0							13	7		
MODE	0-3	0	0	0		0	0			0	0							0	0		
EQUIPM'T	0-31	1	1	1		1	1			1	1							6	4		
MOVEMENT	0-31	7	7	7		6	6			6	6							5	7		
ARRIVAL	0-99	10	10	10		13	13			10	10							10	10		
MAX STREN.	0-15	12	12	12		12	12			12	12							3	12		
INIT. STREN.	0-15	12	10	10		5	7			7	8							3	10		
RATING	0-15	3	3	3		2	2			2	2							6	6		
RANGE	0-15	0	0	0		0	0			0	0							6	0		
FATIGUE	0-7	7	7	7		7	7			7	7							7	7		
EXPERIENCE	0-7	3	3	3		1	1			1	1							3	4		
ATTACHM'T	0-4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	1		



HEADQUARTERS DATA

FORMATION		XX HQ	1/RHQ	2/RHQ	3/RHQ	4/RHQ
HQ I.D.	[8]	91st PA	1/91st	2/91st	3/91st	
UNIT TYPE	[8]	Infantry	Infantry	Militia	Militia	
HQ ADMIN	0-7	3	4	2	2	
LEADERSHIP	0-7	4	3	1	2	
HQ SUPPLY	0-7	4	7	5	5	
BRITTLE	0-1	0	0	1	1	
MOVEMENT	0-31	6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
ARRIVAL	0-99	12	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
LOCATION	(x,y)	21,19	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

BATTALION DATA

FORMATION	II/III	1/1	2/1	3/1	4/1	1/2	2/2	3/2	4/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	1/4	2/4	3/4	4/4	1/-	2/-	3/-	4/-
UNIT I.D.	[3]	1	2	3		1	2			1	2							Art	Eng	Res	
LOCATION	(x,y)	19,16	19,17	20,17		23,15	23,16			21,16	22,15							21,22	21,21	21,27	
CLASS	0-13	0	0	0		0	0			0	0							13	7	11	
MODE	0-3	0	0	0		0	0			0	0							0	0	0	
EQUIPM'T	0-31	1	1	1		1	1			1	1							6	4	10	
MOVEMENT	0-31	7	7	7		6	6			6	6							5	7	12	
ARRIVAL	0-99	12	12	12		12	12			12	12							12	12	15	
MAX STREN.	0-15	12	12	12		12	12			12	12							3	12	4	
INIT. STREN.	0-15	10	9	9		7	6			6	7							3	9	4	
RATING	0-15	3	3	3		2	2			2	2							6	6	9	
RANGE	0-15	0	0	0		0	0			0	0							6	0	1	
FATIGUE	0-7	7	7	7		7	7			7	7							7	7	7	
EXPERIENCE	0-7	3	3	3		1	1			1	1							3	3	4	
ATTACHM'T	0-4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	1	1	

BACK TO BATAAN - Briefing

AXIS			ALLIED		
SIDE [16] JAPAN			SIDE [16] UNITED STATES		
CORPS [16] XIV Army			CORPS [16] Nth Luzon Force		
COMMANDER [16] Gen. Homma			COMMANDER [16] Gen. Wainwright		
DAY	NIGHT	SUPPORT	DAY	NIGHT	
35	0	QUANTITY (0-99)	8	0	
3	0	RELIABILITY (0-3)	0	0	
13	0	RATING (0-15)	7	0	
AIR SUPERIORITY (0-7)					
STATUS = 1			STRONG AXIS		
RELIABILITY = 0			ERRATIC		

SCENARIO [16] Back to Bataan	
BRIEFING [26] Homma's Assault on Luzon 22nd - 29th December, 1941	
(0-3) START = 0	am
(1-31) DATE = 22	22nd DEC 1941
(1-12) MONTH = 12	
(0-99) YEAR = 41	
(0-20) CENTURY = 19	
(1-16) LENGTH = 8	
(0-3) WEATHER = 2	LIGHT OVERCAST
(0-7) FORECAST = 3	BUILDING
(0-7) CLIMATE = 2	TROPICAL
(0-31) MECH MIN = 12	
BRITTLINESS NIGHT CAPABLE	
(0-9) AXIS = 0 %	(0-1) AXIS = 1
(0-9) ALLIED = 60 %	(0-1) ALLIED = 0

BACK TO BATAAN - Terrain Effects Chart

TERRAIN CODE (T0-T15)	TERRAIN NAME [10]	TERRAIN COSTS PER HEX		ATTACK EFFECTS		
		MECH (0-31)	NON-MECH (0-31)	ARM (0-7)	ART (0-7)	INF (0-7)
T0	Ocean	0	0	0	0	0
T1(RET)	-	-	-	-	-	-
T2	Woods	5	3	4	4	5
T3	Mountain	0	5	3	5	4
T4	-	-	-	-	-	-
T5	Rough	4	3	5	5	5
T6	Swamp	0	6	2	3	4
T7	Savannah	2	2	7	7	7
T8	-	-	-	-	-	-
T9	Airfield	2	2	7	7	7
T10	-	-	-	-	-	-
T11	-	-	-	-	-	-
T12	-	-	-	-	-	-
T13	-	-	-	-	-	-
T14	-	-	-	-	-	-
T15	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	ROAD	1	1	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
-	FORT	N.A.	N.A.	0	0	0
-	CITY	N.A.	N.A.	6	6	6
-	BRIDGE	1	1	6	7	5
-	RIVER	N.A.	4	6	7	4

BACK TO BATAAN - Objectives


LD.	Name [11]	Map Loc [x,y]	Div. (0-3)	Start (1-99)	End (1-99)	Pts/Turn (0-30)	Pts/End (0-255)
1(AX)	Labrador	2,7	1	1	21	5	5
2(AX)	Dagupan	7,6	1	1	19	5	5
3(AX)	Camiling	8,14	1	1	25	5	5
4(AX)	Damortis	10,2	1	1	13	5	5
5(AX)	Bamban	12,23	1	1	31	5	15
6(AX)	Clark Field	12,25	1	1	31	10	50
7(AX)	Cupayo	15,12	1	1	23	5	5
8(AX)	San Quintin	18,7	1	1	19	5	5
9(AX)	San Hose	21,11	1	1	25	5	5
10(AX)	Cabanatuan	21,18	1	1	29	5	5
11(AX)	Sibul Sprgs	21,25	1	1	31	10	50
12(AX)	Bongabon	24,16	1	1	27	5	5
1(AL)	Labrador	2,7	0	1	31	1	5
2(AL)	Dagupan	7,6	2	5	31	5	75
3(AL)	Camiling	8,14	2	11	31	5	75
4(AL)	Damortis	10,2	1	2	31	5	75
5(AL)	Bamban	12,23	2	1	31	2	50
6(AL)	Clark Field	12,25	2	1	31	2	50
7(AL)	Cupayo	15,12	3	7	31	5	75
8(AL)	San Quintin	18,7	1	9	31	5	75
9(AL)	San Hose	21,11	3	13	31	5	75
10(AL)	Cabanatuan	21,18	3	1	31	2	50
11(AL)	Sibul Sprgs	21,25	3	1	31	2	50
12(AL)	Bongabon	24,16	3	15	31	5	75

BACK TO BATAAN - Miscellaneous Factors

ADJACENT ENEMY HEX PENALTY (AXIS/ALLIED) (0-15)			
1st Hex =	0 2	4th Hex =	3 6
2nd Hex =	3 4	5th Hex =	3 6
3rd Hex =	3 6	6th Hex =	3 6

VICTORY POINTS PER STRENGTH POINT ELIM. (0-15)		
	NON MECH MECH	
AXIS	5	3
ALLIED	5	1

MAP SIZE	
ACROSS (0-2)	1
DOWN (0-3)	3



HEADQUARTERS DATA

FORMATION		XX HQ	1/RHQ	2/RHQ	3/RHQ	4/RHQ
HQ I.D.	[8]	Phil Div	31st Reg	45th Reg	57th Reg	
UNIT TYPE	[8]	Infantry	Infantry	Infantry	Infantry	
HQ ADMIN	0-7	5	5	5	5	
LEADERSHIP	0-7	4	4	4	5	
HQ SUPPLY	0-7	5	7	7	7	
BRITTLE	0-1	0	0	0	0	
MOVEMENT	0-31	8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
ARRIVAL	0-99	12	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
LOCATION	(x,y)	21,19	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

BATTALION DATA

FORMATION	II/III	1/1	2/1	3/1	4/1	1/2	2/2	3/2	4/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	1/4	2/4	3/4	4/4	1/-	2/-	3/-	4/-
UNIT I.D.	[3]	1	2	3	23	1	2	3	24	1	2	3	24					14	12	Res	
LOCATION	(x,y)	19,16	19,17	20,17	20,17	23,15	23,16	24,16	24,17	21,16	22,15	21,17	22,16					21,22	21,21	21,27	
CLASS	0-13	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	13					13	7	11	
MODE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					0	0	0	
EQUIP'M'T	0-31	1	1	1	11	1	1	1	11	1	1	1	11					11	4	10	
MOVEMENT	0-31	8	8	8	6	8	8	8	6	8	8	8	6					6	8	12	
ARRIVAL	0-99	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12					12	12	15	
MAX STREN.	0-15	12	12	12	4	12	12	12	4	12	12	12	4					8	12	4	
INIT. STREN.	0-15	12	12	12	4	12	12	12	4	12	12	12	4					8	12	4	
RATING	0-15	7	7	7	9	7	7	7	9	7	7	7	9					9	8	9	
RANGE	0-15	0	0	1	10	0	0	1	10	0	0	1	10					10	0	1	
FATIGUE	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7					7	7	7	
EXPERIENCE	0-7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4					4	4	4	
ATTACHM'T	0-4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	1	3	

Continued from p.14

Define Miscellaneous Factors [5.13]. Enter the appropriate data from the Terrain Effects Chart and the Miscellaneous Factors Chart on pages 20-21.

Create Map [5.14]. Use the accompanying map to build up the screen map. Do not forget to assign control to each hex. All hexes begin the game under Allied control.

Save the game again. How often you save really depends on how lucky you feel. After several major disasters, I choose to save after each section is completed.

Equipment Roster [5.22]. Enter the data shown on page 14.

Troop Creation [5.21]. The lone Japanese division is shown on page 16. The three Allied divisions are shown on pages 17-19. Enter the data into the appropriate locations.

Note that an additional Allied division, the Philippines Division, appears on page 22. This is for use in the early commitment variant.

Axis/Allied Objectives [5.23]. Enter the data shown in the Objectives Chart on page 21.

Finally, save again and the scenario is ready to play.

PLAYER NOTES

These are very straight-forward. The Japanese have a tremendous advantage in troop quality. This is counter-balanced by a very demanding schedule of conquest.

The Japanese troops must keep continually on the move, capturing each objective at least three or four turns before its victory points expire.

If the Allied player can hold his opponent for a couple of turns anywhere in the first 2-3 days, then you may throw him off schedule enough to win. Be warned, however, that many of your Filipino recruits are brittle and will melt away once casualties rise. Each Allied division has at least one non-brittle regiment and you should use these as much as possible to protect your brittle regiments.

VARIANTS

1. The almost uncontested air support provided by the IJAAF played a major role in the Japanese success. Assume that the USAAF had survived the first week of war. Reduce the Axis day support points from 35 to 20. Reduce the reliability from 3 to 2. Increase the Allied day support points from 8 to 20. Increase the reliability from 0 to 2. Change the air superiority from 1 (Strong Axis) to 3 (Weak Axis).

2. The only American division in the Philippines was not committed until the defense of Bataan. Assume it was committed against the Japanese landings. To implement this variant, overwrite the Allied 3rd division data (the 91st Filipino) with the Philippines Division data as shown on page 22. Incorporate the improved Allied air power from variant 1. Add 3 to the points per turn awarded to the Japanese for the conquest of each objective. Where appropriate, add 2 to the number of turns each objective remains operative for Japanese forces. One new equipment type needs to be added; enter 105mmHow in slot 11.

BONUS SCENARIO

Rather than a third variant scenario, disk subscribers have a bonus. The landing of the Japanese 16th division at Antimonan and its drive to Manila is simulated in this scenario. The advice to both players is exactly the same as for the Back to Bataan scenario.

The Japanese have one formation, the 16th Infantry Division while the Allies have two, the 41st and 51st Divisions of the Philippine Army.

SPECIAL NOTE

Commodore disk subscribers should also be aware that there are two sides to the Back to Bataan scenario disk. Use Side 1 if you plan to run the scenario with the *Halls of Montezuma* or *Rommel* master disks. Use Side 2 if you plan to run the scenario with the *Battlefront* or *Battles in Normandy* master disks. ♦

Continued from p. 12

same lines, and provide a means of "running" your thoughts or efforts past others with similar interests. I realize this may well be outside the scope of *Run 5*, but I offer it as a suggestion.

As I also believe you are open to suggestions for new developments, may I suggest some possibilities that would interest me, and probably others. Perhaps a game similar to *Europe Ablaze* catering for modern Air Combat, possibly on a more tactical scale, may be of interest. This would open up many possibilities, such as the Air War in Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli wars, Indian/Pakistan disagreements, and many hypothetical possibilities (Air Operations near the Falklands, World War III in Germany etc).

Another type of game that may go well is a tactical or strategic game, maybe somewhat like CAW, catering for modern naval Operations (The Falklands again?). As you can see, my leaning is towards games that would allow simulation of fairly modern warfare, and this is because of my RAAF service.

Having taken much of your time, may I close now by saying once again how much I enjoy your present offerings, keep up the good work!

FltLt D. Freeman
Sale, Vic.
OZ

Dear SSG,

Please renew my magazine subscription. The address is correct.

Thank you for mentioning news of the Amiga conversion of *Battlefront!* Can't wait. Since using A500 my *Battlefront* and *Russia* for 128 have gone to chip heaven. I play *Kampfgruppe* on A500 a lot, but interesting as it can be, it lacks the depth, scope and manipulation of SSG games. Plus the darn thing crashed near the end of the game sometimes.

Really hope the Amiga versions use mouse/pointer methods to make all

Continued on p. 25

SCENARIO UPDATES FOR THE BATTLEFRONT GAME SYSTEM

By Malcolm Power

As promised, another four of the older Battlefront Game System scenarios are upgraded to Halls of Montezuma/Rommel standard.

All the remaining older scenarios will be upgraded in the next issue. This includes all magazine scenarios from Issues 3-7 inclusive.

UTAH

(Battles in Normandy)

1. Map

The Allied adjacent hex penalties are 0,0,1,2,3,4.

The name, movement and combat values for terrain type T9 have been omitted. In the T9 slot, enter (DEFENCES, 10, 4, 1,2,4). Thus, both terrain types T9 and T11 are DEFENCES. Note that this addition should also be made to the Sword scenario which was revised in Issue 9.

2. Units

Add 1 to the divisional supply values of Axis divisions 1 (77th Inf) and 2 (91st Air-Landing).

Add 2 to the divisional supply value of Axis division 3 (243rd Inf)

3. Objectives

Axis

Assign Div 1 to Valognes.

Assign Div 2 to Montebourg and St Colombe.

Assign Div 3 to Bricquebec and St Sauveur.

Allies

Assign Div 1 to Montebourg and St Jacques.

Assign Div 2 to St Mere-Eglise, Chef-Dupont and Barneville.

Assign Div 2 to Carteret, Canquigny and Portbail.

VILLERS BOCAGE

(Battles in Normandy)

1. Map

The Allied adjacent hex penalties are 0,0,1,2,3,4.

2. Units

Subtract 1 from the divisional supply values of Axis divisions 1 (Pz Lehr) and 2 (2 Pz).

Subtract 1 from the regimental supply values of Pz Lehr regiments 1 (901), 2 (902), 3 (Comp) and 4 (KG 12SS).

Subtract 1 from the regimental supply value of regiment 3 (Royals) of the British 7th Armoured Division.

Change the following unit strengths. Read the changes as (current strength/maximum strength).

Pz Lehr/901 - 1 Bn (8/10), 2 Bn (7/10)

Pz Lehr/902 - 1 Bn (9/10), 2 Bn (7/10)

Pz Lehr/KG 12SS - 1 Bn (8/10), 2 Bn (8/10)

The recon battalion asset from 2 Pz should have an equipment value of 3 (SdKfz251).

3. Objectives

Axis

Assign Div 1 to Tilly, Juvigny, Hotot and Point 213.

Assign Div 2 to Sourdeval, Villers and Tracy.

Allies

Assign Div 1 to Villers and Tracy.

Assign Div 2 to Tilly and Juvigny.

EPSOM

(Battles in Normandy)

1. Map

The Allied adjacent hex penalties are 0,0,1,2,3,4.

2. Units

The 1st tank battalion asset from 12SS Pz should have an equipment value 9 (Pz V) The 2nd tank battalion asset from 12SS Pz should have an equipment value 8 (Pz IV).

3. Objectives

Axis

Assign Div 1 to Cheux.

Assign Div 2 to Gaurus and Baron.

Assign Div 3 to Carpiquet and Point 112.

Allies

Assign Div 1 to Mouen, Cheux and Point 112.

Assign Div 2 to Rauray, La Valtru, Grainville and Gaurus.

Assign Div 3 to Baron, Evrecy and To St Andre.

GOODWOOD

(Battles in Normandy)

1. Map

The Allied adjacent hex penalties are 0,0,0,1,1,3.

2. Units

Subtract 2 from the divisional supply value of Axis division 1 (1SS/12SS Pz).

Subtract 1 from the divisional supply values of Axis divisions 2 (21 Pz) and 3 (116 Pz/272 Inf).

3. Objectives

Axis

Assign Div 1 to Bourgebus, Sequeville and Argences. Assign Div 2 to Cagny and Emieville. Assign Div 3 to Bras, St Andre and Garcelle.

Allies

Assign Div 1 to Soliers, St Andre and Garcelle. Assign Div 2 to Denouville and Argences.

Assign Div 3 to Cagny, Bourgebus and Bras. ◆

Continued from p. 23

that screen work easier. Amiga game play interfaces and sounds can be incredible - adult market should really love SSG on it.

Will the magazine plus disk subscription be available for Amiga users? Imagine it will be. In the meanwhile, I'm hoping the 64/128 versions can be used on Amiga versions of SSG games.

Got to mention that I read an Atari commercial programmer lamenting the ST piracy issue. Said his company won't develop for ST any word processing or spreadsheet programs. Piracy appears to be rampant on that machine. If SSG ever has to adopt a copy protection scheme, would you consider the keyword/manual method. Least difficult to user, safe and still allows a needed backup copy.

Thanks again for support of Amiga and terrific games!

Frank Graham

NYC, NY.

USA

Dear Messrs. Keating and Trout,

This letter is meant to serve two purposes. Firstly to purchase a disk subscription to your wonderful magazine - *Run 5*, which is in my opinion unparalleled in the gaming world for the support it provides your games.

Secondly, to compliment you on your fine game - *Decisive Battles of the American Civil War*. Not having any interest at all in the Civil War, I still bought the game from the unspoken recommendation of the rest of your fine games. Was I impressed! It has suddenly become my most played game and given me a new interest in this area.

If your upcoming *Decisive Battles of the Napoleonic Wars* can do for that period what DBACW has done for the Civil War then even Napoleon would be impressed.

Continued on p. 29

ENTER OUR DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR DESIGN CONTEST

Prizes totaling \$1,000 will be awarded to the authors of the winning entries. There are two categories for submission. The first is scenario variants. The second is original scenarios.

Scenario variants are historical 'what ifs'. Take one of the historical scenarios and modify the data to reflect what could have happened had circumstances been different. Original scenarios are whatever you wish to create. We would prefer they bear some relationship to history, but it's up to you. In both cases, we would like to see as much use made of WarPaint™ as possible. There must be some graphic geni out there.

Submit entries on a floppy disk together with the documentation suggested on p.29. The judge's decision will be final, etc. The winning entries will be published in Issues 12 and/or 13. All entries become the property of SSG and may be used for publication from time to time. A suitable payment for such publication will be made.

All submissions must be sent to our Australian office. Overseas entrants are advised to wrap the disk in foil as a precaution against magnetic erasure.

DO IT YOURSELF!

Scenario Design Guide-lines for the Battlefront Game System and Decisive Battles of the American Civil War

Malcolm Power Explains...

Throughout military history the combination of many, varied ingredients has combined to control the outcome of campaigns and battles alike. The combination of "what ifs" are endless, each with its own mystique.

Access to the data bases of BGS and DBACW, via WarPlan™, allows players to create their own variants to our scenarios, correct data they don't agree with or create entirely original scenarios. While we're not sure just how many do take the plunge into creating a new scenario for themselves, our scenario competitions have proven that a wide variety of expertise in this field does exist amongst our users.

It seemed logical then to encourage this, as the more scenarios that become available, the greater enjoyment we all get from our hobby. To that end, this article will briefly outline an order of steps to follow that should be of some assistance to fellow BGS and DBACW fanatics out there who want to cook up a little history of their own.

Elsewhere in this issue, you will find details of our next scenario/variant design competition. We hope this article will both encourage more entries and make the design process easier to use.

At the end of this article is a list of the documentation that we consider to be the minimum necessary to allow us to fairly appraise scenarios submitted by

users for either competition entries or magazine publication. We found it difficult during contest judging to evaluate submissions on topics we were unfamiliar with, unless they were well-documented. We consider that the adoption of a minimum documentation standard will allow all entries to stand clearly on their own merits.

THE STEPS IN SCENARIO DESIGN

Each topic chosen will be unique, and presents the designer with different challenges; therefore no rules can guarantee perfect results. If this were the case, half the challenge would be lost. I find, however, that the following steps are useful in minimizing the problems that can arise.

1. Order of Battle

The key to unit performance is found in its organizational structure. To effectively simulate a military formation in battle, its structure must be reflected in the game's systems.

BGS and DBACW use different forma-

tion structures to control units within the game. Players need the capability to command units as they were historically used, often the designer must modify the 'book' OB to one that reflects the actual employment of troops on the battlefield.

A good example of this is found in the DBACW *South Mountain* scenario. Here, most southern brigades are independent and are attached directly to the Army HQ, rather than being organized into divisions. This makes the South more flexible to command. Hill successfully committed brigades independently at South Mountain, without regard to divisional integrity, therefore the player should be encouraged, and allowed, to do the same.

BGS uses a fixed OB structure, but careful use can effectively represent most command structures. Combined arms plays a major role in modern combat, and OB design in BGS allows designers to simulate combined arms doctrine as used by different regiments. In attack and defence, regiments in the BGS receive bonuses if a suitable combined arms team is present.

Consequently, good doctrine will give a regiment either integral artillery and armour, (e.g. a German Kampfgruppe) or access to them as divisional assets (e.g. a standard American infantry division in late WWII). In contrast, the poor performance of British armoured divisions after D-Day was largely due to virtually non-existent infantry-armour co-operation. In the BGS this is represented by British tank battalions being separated from their infantry counterparts.

2. The Map

The flow of a battle is controlled by the terrain over which it is fought. A good scenario will faithfully represent the terrain, in game terms, and therefore preserve the flow.

(i.) Scale

The scale chosen should result in a unit density that mirrors reality.

Post D-Day battles in Normandy have a high density, (especially for the Allies) when compared to the more open desert battles. Bear in mind that a unit has a attack capability over two hexes (even for range 0 units) in *BGS* and in *DBACW* a unit with skirmish orders can engage a target two hexes distant, in this case it being assumed that a regiment or two has been sent forward to pin or harass the enemy. Also remember that in both games, the fewer map sections used the faster the games will play.

(ii). Rivers and Prohibited Hexes

I always draw rivers first as they have the most effect on the game mechanics, and also define the basic topography of the land. Remember, rivers are impassable to all units in *DBACW* and all but non-mech units in *BGS*. Only major

obstacles to movement should be portrayed by rivers and care must be taken to allow realistic crossing capability by provision of fords and bridges.

Always be on the look-out for 'river traps' that can trip up the movement routines. River traps can occur when a unit must move *further* away from its objective to avoid the impassable river hex-side.

The computer's movement routines will sometimes overcome these traps, especially if there are nearby roads to help, but you should always be aware of the problems which may arise due to convoluted rivers. Such traps can seriously imbalance a scenario. If a game plays more accurately with a crossing added, or by removing a minor kink in a river, then do it.

(iii). Roads

Just as rivers are the most significant negative movement factor, roads are the most positive. The computer relies on the road system to aid it in making sensible movement decisions. Don't forget that when you are the commander your computer staff have their maps out and are telling all your battalions (*BGS*), and all non-directly con-

trolled brigades (*DBACW*) which way to go. Generally, keep roads to a minimum and omit dead-end roads leading to destroyed bridges etc., unless some path is provided to lead the route onward.

Note that in *DBACW*, cosmetic roads can be used for dead ends. This preserves the historical 'look' of the battlefield without confusing the computer.

Both roads and hidden roads (the latter in *DBACW* only) can help define a path through rugged or partially prohibited terrain, but their effect must be evaluated during testing.

(iv). Forts and Fortifications

Forts in both games are useful to inform the computer that "this is a good position to hold". Units in both games will tend to hold their ground when occupying a fort, even if the fort value is relatively low. Read the entrenchment rules introduced with Vol II of *DBACW* before deciding between forts and entrenchments.

3. Objectives

Objectives tell both human and computer players where to go, but more importantly - how to win!

OBJECTIVE SCHEDULE

NUMBER (1)					
NAME (1)					
FIRST ACTIVE TURN (1)					
LAST ACTIVE TURN (1)					
POINTS PER TURN (2)					
POINTS AT END (2)					
START OWNER (1)					
END OWNER (1)					
ACTIVE TURNS HELD (1)					
POINTS GAINED (2)					
TURN TAKEN/LOST (1)					
MANOEUVRE VALUE (<i>DBACW</i>) (2)					
DIV. OBJECTIVE (<i>BGS</i>) (1)					

Schedule 1

(i). Planning and Placement

The first step in designing objectives is to draw a map showing *front-line movements* at critical times during the scenario. This will tell you which points were under whose control at various times throughout the battle. When a commander had several options for his main thrust, additional (non-historical) lines may have to be considered. Once the map is prepared, significant objectives can be added, followed by any extra ones needed as signposts or manoeuvre points.

(ii). Point Values

For each objective, calculate the historical turns of possession for each side, along with end game possession. Enter this data on an objective schedule similar to the one shown in Schedule 1. Prepare one schedule for each

side. Those values marked with a (1) can be taken directly from your historical map. Those values marked (2) must be generated by you. Until you feel confident with scenario design, make the first and last active turns the first and last turns of the game.

The *Back to Bataan* scenario in this issue has some objectives where the first active turn is not the first turn of the game. This technique allows you to 'window' the turns when an objective must be occupied.

Working with the above schedule, your aim is to assign points so that if the battle were to end with an historical result then the points total for each side would be equal.

The work invested here in establishing a base line for victory point values will be rewarded during testing as the

computer's performance can be easily gauged by referring to your front line map and victory schedule.

The size of objective point awards should be relative to the point value set for casualty rates. Some adjustments may need to be made during balancing to allow for acceptable losses sustained by the attacker.

(iii). Divisional Objectives in BGS

All objectives in BGS and DBACW are active the whole game for computer or human access, and can be targeted for movement whether active or not. (The active turns are for per turn victory point allocation only.) However, in BGS (*Halls of Montezuma* and *Rommel* only; this feature is not present in the earlier titles) divisional objectives were added to more clearly define a division's role in battle. If selected as a divisional objec-

TEST RECORD SHEET (BGS)

TEST NUMBER						
AXIS OBJ. 1						
AXIS OBJ. 2						
AXIS OBJ. 3						
AXIS OBJ. etc.						
AXIS OBJ. TOTAL						
AXIS MECH CAS.						
AXIS NON-MECH CAS.						
AXIS TOTAL						
ALLIED OBJ. 1						
ALLIED OBJ. 2						
ALLIED OBJ. 3						
ALLIED OBJ. etc						
ALLIED OBJ. TOTAL						
ALLIED MECH CAS.						
ALLIED NON-MECH CAS.						
ALLIED TOTAL						
WINNING MARGIN						

Schedule 2

tive the objective will still function completely normally, but additionally the computer will choose the objective nearest the division HQ that is enemy held and active (i.e. for victory points per turn) as the divisional objective for the specified division. This objective will be flagged as the 'current divisional objective'.

The CDO becomes the focal point for the divisions attack and as such the computer player will attempt to take, or regain this position by offensive action as soon as possible. To this end the computer will pick the closest regimental HQ to the CDO as the attack regiment, and assign it the divisional assets. Other regiments will be assigned to active divisional objectives closer to their regimental HQs, or other objectives until the CDO is taken, changed, or the attack regiment's losses necessitate its withdrawal (reserve). Note that a regiment in reserve is exempt from selection in all cases.

For the human player the CDO defines the planned axis of attack for the division, battalion commanders (computer controlled) will tend to penetrate toward the targeted objective. Thus a thrust towards the CDO will be most effective, with isolated regiments moving towards other divisional objectives in their localities.

Some player's dislike not having the ability to define the divisional objective themselves. It should be noted that divisional objectives simulate the lines of demarcation between divisions that are planned prior to the campaign at army level and are not generally controlled by corps commanders (similar to the army objectives in *DBACW*).

If no divisional objectives are active or enemy controlled, target choices will revert to the original *BGS* priorities. These are -

- * The computer is strongly biased to attack towards CDOs.

- * Depending on the circumstances in the scenario, careful timing of active divisional objectives will enhance the performance of computer and human players.

- * Giving a reinforcing division a set of divisional objectives behind friendly lines will cause it to counter-attack these points if lost to the enemy, provided free regiments exist.

- * Divisional objectives are offensive in nature, if a side in defence has limited ability to counter-attack, divisional objectives should be used for critical points only. The best course may be to set no divisional objectives for this division as the standard intelligence will defend, give ground with minimal losses, while still attempting to hold objectives and react to enemy forces.

4. Testing and Balancing

First watch the game play to make sure no major problems exist in your data. "No battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy", but once the powder starts flying things soon sort themselves out one way or the other.

To display and analyse the results of several games on one sheet, it is convenient to prepare a *test record sheet*. See Schedule 2 for an example. The test record sheet for *DBACW* is much the same. After several games have been recorded, a pattern of results will appear that can be evaluated.

The task now is to adjust the scenario so that the unit performance averages out at about the mean historical result. Many situations don't lend themselves to a finely balanced conclusion as the loss of one key position may cause the whole line to crumble. Such games can result in large victories to either side with few close results.

The main rule to observe when adjusting scenarios is to modify the least known factors or relativities in your design first. It is vital to test fully after each change or correction to determine its effect. The number of tests needed depends on the scenario; a bare minimum is 4 for minor changes. More tests will be necessary in peculiar circumstances. For example -

- (i). In *BGS* if one side has overwhelming air superiority combined with fluctuating weather conditions (e.g. Normandy). Extra clear skies for the Allies can make it tough for the Germans, and the reverse is also true.

- (ii). In *DBACW*, the likelihood value can significantly effect results.

Once each side is achieving the desired results, consult your final version on the test form. Adjust the victory points, if necessary, to obtain the best balance possible. Having done this run one last set of tests to confirm your results.

Now you should be able to sit down and beat the computer at its own game. Play testing may find loopholes in your design that may need attention. Generally, if the objectives have been correctly set, the computer's intelligence will give most players a run for their money.

SCENARIO MINIMUM DOCUMENTATION LIST

When submitting scenarios to us, we will look very favourably on those submissions which include all of the following

1. Map showing front-line movements and objectives
2. Objective Schedule
3. Test record sheet showing final version test results
4. Historical description of scenario topic. ♦

Continued from p.25

I am also eagerly awaiting all of your other upcoming releases as described in *Run 5*. Have you finished 3rd Ed. RFTS yet? I would like to know.

J. Kavanagh
Charlestown, NSW.
OZ.

Dear John,

Again, I want to wish you and your family a very Happy and Health New Year and a prosperous one for SSG. Enclosed you will find the *Halls of Montezuma* disk that appears to be faulty. The problems that I've had with this disk are on the Scenario side. I am contacting Apple's *Compute* publication to attempt and write a review of this game for their publication. If I'm not successful there, I will try some of the other Apple publications to see if I get any success.

Being an old time wargamer for over 10 years with boardgames and computer games, speaking professionally, I can

Continued on p.48

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

A Short History in Two Parts

By Stephen Hart

Part Two

Following upon the twin disasters at Second Bull Run and Fredericksburg, the Army of the Potomac was desperate for a good commander. They were destined not to get one for a little while yet.

THE RISE AND FALL OF JOSEPH HOOKER

On 25th January 1863, General Joseph "Fighting Joe" Hooker was appointed commander of the Army of the Potomac. He had a good record as an aggressive but intelligent fighter and Lincoln hoped that he had at long last found the commander he had been looking for.

Hooker's arrival was welcomed by the troops. He ordered vegetables and soft bread to be added to the diet, cleaned up the unsanitary camps, instituted furloughs and arranged for six months back pay to be delivered to all concerned. Reviews and parades were ordered to keep the men busy and personal corps insignia were introduced to give men more pride in their units.

The tone of the army improved rapidly. To combat Confederate cavalry superiority he re-organized the Union cavalry so that instead of being attached to infantry commanders on a regimental basis, it was formed into a single corps, 11,500 strong under Brigadier General George Stoneman.

With over 130,000 men and 412 guns, Hooker had approximately double his opponent's numbers in each depart-

ment and was well aware of the fact. He planned to use these numbers in a pincer movement, whereby one half of the army would cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg and the other would cross upstream and come around on Lee's rear. Each half of the pincer would be about as big as Lee's entire army. Stoneman's cavalry, meanwhile, would be spreading confusion behind the lines (although in the event this last achieved little).

Rain in early April delayed the advance but by the end of the month the movement was underway. By leaving Gibbon's division in its camp in Falmouth which was visible from Lee's encampment, he initially fooled Lee about his flanking movement, although not for long.

On 30th April, watching Sedgwick digging in his bridgehead to the south, Lee made his decision: "The main attack will come from above" he said referring, presumably, to the river rather than the heavens. He moved about 45,000 men under Anderson, McLaws and Jackson towards Hooker, leaving Early with a scant 10,000 to hold Sedgwick.

On 1st May Hooker, for some reason, declined to advance out of the tangled wilderness country into the open

ground which would so favour his superior numbers, especially in artillery, and went on to the defensive. Jackson organized a flanking movement on the 2nd and attacked Hooker's unprepared right flank. On the 3rd Sedgwick attacked and broke through at Marye's Heights and attempted to come to Hooker's rescue but was held near Bank's Ford and Salem Church. On the 4th, Lee counter-attacked Sedgwick but could not drive him from the ford and Hooker spent the day digging in. His nerve failed him during the night, however, and he ordered a full retreat.

Lee was furious that Hooker's army had escaped him but he should probably have been giving thanks instead. Had Hooker displayed the pig-headed stubbornness of Rosecrans at Murfreesboro and held fast it is likely that Lee, assaulting superior numbers within prepared defences, would have been massacred. It might truthfully be said that Lee defeated Hooker, rather than Hooker's army per se. Hooker himself acknowledged that "For once, I lost confidence in Joe Hooker".

Hooker sat back and waited for the axe which duly descended in the middle of June when his command was given to Meade.

Yet it was the victorious Southern army which suffered the severest loss of generals for Jackson contracted pneumonia after being accidentally shot and died in delirium on May 10th and his absence in future battles was often critical. His dying words "Let us cross over the river and rest under the shade of the trees" became a standard euphemism for death for following generations of Southerners.

THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN

Vicksburg, controlling the central stretch of the Mississippi, was a nut of the very toughest variety. Not only was it perched on high, unscalable red-clay bluffs from which guns could rake the Mississippi, it was also very difficult to get at geographically. Directly to the north was the leaf-shaped Mississippi-Yazoo delta, a swampy region utterly impassable to any large body of troops. Gunboats could not sail down past Vicksburg without being shredded and a determined resistance at Port Hudson, some 100 miles downstream, was preventing boats from sailing upstream.

Grant planned a two-pronged attack. Sherman would sail down the Mississippi, turn the fleet up the Yazoo and attempt to land on the bluffs to the north of Vicksburg. Grant, meanwhile, would march south down the railroad through Grenada, defeating Pemberton on the way. The plan did not work out at all well, largely due to the efforts of Nathan Bedford Forrest and Earl Van Dorn. Forrest led a December raid which cut Grant's supply line to bits. Van Dorn, eager to rehabilitate his reputation after the Corinth fiasco, led a second raid to destroy a large supply dump at Holly Springs. With his supplies gone and no method of bringing in more, Grant was forced to retreat to Memphis, living off the land as he went. Sherman's attack on Haines Bluff was no more successful for he found it impossible to advance up the steep cliffs under heavy fire. Undiscouraged by these two failures, Grant kept at work throughout the difficult wet season, undertaking projects which eventually brought the total to seven:

The First Canal: Sherman was given the job of cutting a canal across the tongue of land in front of Vicksburg to divert the river channel and thus bypass the batteries. One thousand men per day struggled in the rain and mud until the dam at the upper end gave way and, instead of scouring a channel, flooded the camp, causing the loss of many horses and much equipment.

Lake Providence: About fifty miles north of Vicksburg, Lake Providence was cut off from the west bank of the



The Battle of Gettysburg
Confederate Troops Assault Cemetery Ridge

Mississippi by a levee. However, Bayou Baxter drained it west into Bayou Macon, which flowed into the Tensas River, which flowed into the Red River which finally joined the Mississippi a few miles above Port Hudson. Despite the 470 mile detour which this route would necessitate, Grant thought the idea worth a try. Further investigation, however, showed that the Bayou Baxter was blocked by cypress trees and flood wreckage. Extensive work with underwater saws achieved little except exercise for the troops.

Yazoo Pass: Grant simultaneously had another plan to exploit the tangled river system. Just south of Helena, a bayou called the Yazoo Pass allowed passage east from the Mississippi to the Coldwater River, which flowed into the Tallahatchie which combined with the Talbusha to form the Yazoo. A levee currently blocked the entrance but Grant reckoned that by cutting this he could get troops down the Yazoo, land north of Haines Bluff, which was blocking the ascent of the Yazoo from below, and force the defenders out into the open. The levee was passed successfully but the route was often narrow and obstructed and had to be cleared slowly. A hundred miles down the Tallahatchie, the expedition ran into a Confederate fort. Its largest armament was a 6.4 inch rifle but its defenders were stubborn and well dug in and in the narrow river the ironclads could not manoeuvre. Despite repeated attacks the defenders refused to budge and eventually, the whole experiment was

called off and the badly battered ironclads wound their way disconsolately back.

Steele Bayou: Meanwhile, Porter and the navy had been attempting a short cut to the same destination. A drive across flooded banks led east to the Steel Bayou, thence to the Black Bayou, connecting with Deer Creek, connecting with Rolling Fork Bayou, connecting with Sunflower River which flowed into the Yazoo above Haines Bluff. The way was extremely difficult and tangled. Deer Creek wound so much that in one half-mile stretch, five warships could be seen pointing in five different directions. The expedition meandered on for a while but eventually ran into underwater willows which so completely fouled the paddle wheels that Porter gave up and went back.

Second Canal: a brief attempt was made to dig a canal just below Duckport to allow light-draft supply vessels through, but falling river levels made the project impractical and it had to be abandoned.

After seven attempts and seven failures, Grant was no further forward than before, but two new factors had entered into the calculations. Firstly, the waters were receding and roads, albeit axle-deep in mud, were starting to appear.

Secondly, Farragut had successfully run the batteries at Port Hudson with two warships and the Union could now control the waters below Vicksburg. Grant retired to his cabin aboard the *Magnolia* and smoked innumerable

THE BATTLE OF GAINES MILL

27th June, 1862

During McClellan's retreat from before Richmond, known as the "Seven Days", many battles and skirmishes were fought. One of the deadliest was fought on 27th June on Turkey Hill, near Gaines Mill.

Lee had expected McClellan to make a stand along the line of Powhite Creek. A.P. Hill sent in his lead brigade against the riflemen clustered around a building known as Gaines Mill and, after a short fire-fight, the enemy retreated. Lee was just thinking that the whole exercise had been far too easy when there was the sound of heavy firing and Hill's lead brigade came back at the double. Hill brought up three more brigades and, as Longstreet was arriving on the right, sent them in again. Again, the heavy firing and again the troops came back, wild-eyed and diminished in number.

Two miles east of Gaines Mill was a creek known as Boatswain Swamp. It flowed through a clear, boggy area around the front of the flat-topped Turkey Hill. Three separate lines of infantry, one above the other, were dug in and the crest was bristling with guns. Fitz-John Porter had three divisions and orders to hold the hill while the rest of the army retreated, and he and his men were determined to do just that.

Lee ordered Longstreet to make a demonstration on the right while he found out what had happened on the opposite wing where D.H. Hill and Jackson were supposed to be attacking and drawing defenders towards them. He found that Jackson had been delayed by taking a wrong road and had ordered Hill to delay his attack also. Lee ordered Ewell to go in on A.P. Hill's left in support while he sorted things out.

A.P. Hill's men, by this time, had had enough. "You need not go in" they said to Ewell's veterans. "We are whipped; you can't do anything". The veterans, unimpressed, went in at the charge. Again, the triple line of fire and the guns roared out, and such men as were still standing promptly charged back.

The only solution seemed to be a general assault, all along the line. By 5.00 o'clock, Lee had all his men in position in a near semi-circular arc, in order from north to south D.H. Hill, Ewell, Jackson, A.P. Hill and Longstreet. As the attack went in Hood's Texas Brigade and Law's Brigade punched through into the centre.

Porter had, by this time, been re-inforced by another division and was feeling confident. McClellan had sent orders to hold on until dark and had indicated that he would be sending reinforcements. As the massed attack came in his men fired, reloaded and fired at incredible speed. Hood's and Law's Brigades lost nearly a thousand men before they even reached Boatswain Swamp but they took their losses and kept coming and as they closed to bayonet range the Union centre panicked and broke. Fourteen guns and two complete regiments were captured at the point of breakthrough.

Still, this was not the same army that had scattered at First Bull Run. In the falling dusk the retreat was made successfully, covered by 6,000 unperturbed regulars under Sykes and two fresh brigades sent in as reinforcements.

Lee had captured 22 guns, over 2,000 prisoners and had control of the field and could thus claim a victory but he had lost 8,500 men in the process. Porter, including the 2,000 prisoners, had lost 6,837 but had held his position throughout the day. It is unlikely that he was unhappy with the result.

cigars, fitting these new factors into his plans.

The results of these deliberations horrified nearly all those involved. Porter, in the naval chain of command, was not subject to Grant's orders but he acceded to his request to try and run his ships past the Vicksburg batteries, merely pointing out that, once the vessels were downstream, there was no way to get them back up again while the batteries were still functioning. The run was attempted on a moonless and despite a spirited exchange of shots was almost completely successful. The transport Henry Clay was the only vessel lost and not a man had been killed. More transports, this time army-owned, were run through the following night with equal success.

For the army, Grant planned to cross the river south of Vicksburg and advance north with only the most tenuous of supply lines. His generals were aghast. Sherman went so far as to put all his objections in a letter for his friend to read but Grant was unmoved by his subordinates' arguments, epistolatory or otherwise. He was convinced that in this virgin territory he could easily live off the land.

Events proved him correct. The crossing was effected effortlessly and, after pausing to re-supply ammunition, he began the advance in the second week of May. His enemy was still divided - Joe Johnston in Jackson assembling an army and Pemberton partially concentrated near Vicksburg - and Grant intended to exploit this. Leaving McClelland's Corps to cover Pemberton he moved towards Jackson with Sherman's and McPherson's Corps. Outnumbered more than five to one, Johnston was forced to withdraw north and, with the capture of the rail junction at Jackson, Vicksburg was cut off. Grant ordered as much of the railroad as possible destroyed to prevent the rapid deployment of reinforcements from the east. He then moved against Pemberton.

On 16th May, Pemberton attempted to hold Grant east of the Big Black River at a place called Champion's Hill. In a sharp battle the Confederates lost almost 4,000 men killed, wounded or captured and were forced to withdraw. By 18th May the siege of Vicksburg had begun. Assaults on 19th and 22nd

were bloodily repulsed but Grant's position, on the tactical defensive and in contact once more with the northern Mississippi, was almost unassailable. As he wrote on 24th, "the fall of Vicksburg and the capture of most of the garrison can only be a question of time."

Joe Johnston had foreseen this when Grant first landed but Pemberton had failed to obey his orders to first attack Grant's rear and ultimately, to save his army at the expense of Vicksburg. As it was, with Pemberton penned up, Johnston could not concentrate enough force to threaten Grant and he spent a frustrated month moving around the region to the north-east.

At the beginning of July, pounded by gunboat and artillery fire for more than two months, and with the encroaching siege trenches within hand-grenade range, Vicksburg was near the end. The men were weak from lack of food and even the mule and rat meat was running out. On July 4th, Pemberton formally surrendered his entire army of 2,166 officers and 27,230 enlisted men, together with 172 cannon and 60,000 small arms.

More than a year before, the garrison had told Farragut that "Mississippians don't know, and refuse to learn, how to surrender to an enemy". Grant had proved himself to be a skilled educator.

THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

While Pemberton was surrendering at Vicksburg, a far superior general was also experiencing defeat. General Robert E. Lee was fighting at Gettysburg and Pickett's division was being shattered against the barricades on Cemetery Ridge. Following Hooker's defeat at Chancellorsville, Lee had marched north in a campaign dogged by bad luck and bad management.

Not all had been in favour of the campaign. After Chancellorsville, a high level meeting was held in which Secretary of War Seddon and General Longstreet were in favour of moving troops from Virginia to strike at either Rosecrans in the centre, or perhaps Grant at Vicksburg. There was much to be said in favour of the movement but it had one serious flaw - Lee refused to let any

THE BATTLE OF STONES RIVER (MURFREESBORO)

31st Dec. 1862

On the evening of 30th December 1862, Rosecrans, advancing south-east from Nashville, met with Bragg at Stones River, in front of the town of Murfreesboro. Rosecrans had about 44,000 troops under the commands of Crittenden, Thomas and McCook. Bragg was defending with about 34,000 under the commands of Breckenridge, Polk and Hardee. Both commanders planned to attack the following morning and each had the same basic battle-plan - to attack the enemy right - but only Bragg achieved anything like his intent. Rosecrans had ordered a long line of campfires to be kindled beyond his right flank in order to trick Bragg into stripping his own right where the attack would land.

The trick worked in a sense - Bragg certainly moved troops there - but the effect was not what Rosecrans had intended. Ever methodical, he ordered his troops to attack immediately after breakfast. Bragg, however, had ordered his troops to attack before breakfast. Hardee ploughed through McCook's three divisions, caught by surprise while the coffee was still brewing. The divisions of Johnson and Davis immediately routed but Sheridan, commander of the third division, was made of sterner stuff. Polk's Corps was in the fight by now and Withers' division ran into a determined defence in a difficult tangle of rocks, scrub and trees. Three separate charges were repulsed.

Then Polk's second division, under Cheatham, arrived. "Give 'em hell, boys!" he shouted. His corps commander was handicapped in this regard by being the Bishop of Louisiana but he was equal to the occasion. "Give them what General Cheatham says, boys!" he called. And so they forced Sheridan back.

Although the line was now bent at an angle of nearly ninety degrees, Sheridan's stand had given Rosecrans the time he needed to organise a defence. The left flank he anchored at the ford across Stones River. He then rode back and forth, directing the defence in person. The critical point in the line was at the bend of the right angle - a four acre stand of cedars, known locally as the Round Forest and soon to be christened "Hell's Half-Acre" by the soldiers. Bragg attacked repeatedly but in a piecemeal fashion, first with a Mississippi brigade, then with a Tennessee brigade, then with two brigades sent across by Breckinridge and finally with another two brigades. The cotton field in front of Round Forest became a shambles of dead and dying men but the attacks could not withstand the firepower and none achieved the objective.

When the sun went down at 4.30 pm, Bragg had lost about 9,000 men but he was aware that his opponent had lost more, including over 3,000 captured in the first rush. He had achieved a decisive victory and he knew it. The only problem was, no-one had told Rosecrans.

On Jan. 2nd Bragg sent Breckinridge on an ill-advised assault against the Union right but Rosecrans had had a full day to re-organise his defences and the assault was beaten back in just over an hour, with more than 1700 casualties. The next day, Bragg received reports that his opponent was receiving new supplies and re-inforcements and he realised that he must withdraw.

Casualties for the battle had been heavy. The North had lost 13,249 (including 3717 captured) and the South 11,739 (including 2,500 captured). Tactically a bloody draw, the battle was a strategic victory for the Union. Rosecrans had taken Murfreesboro and Northern Tennessee

of his troops go. The South had no equivalent of Halleck, the North's Commander-in-Chief, and, as the President would not go against the advice of his most successful general, that, essentially, was that. Lee proposed, rather, a second invasion of the North, pushing deep into Pennsylvania, which would keep Virginia clear for the harvest and, if perchance Washington could be taken, would encourage foreign intervention. There was even a slight hope that a panic in Washington would cause Grant's recall from Vicksburg, although the Secretary was not sanguine about that possibility. He considered Grant to be "such an obstinate fellow that he could only be induced to quit Vicksburg by terribly hard knocks", in which opinion he was undoubtedly correct.

The Army of Virginia was re-organized and augmented to its pre-Fredericksburg strength of about 75,000 effectives in three corps under Longstreet, Ewell and A.P. Hill. Preparations were made to move north under the cover of Stuart's cavalry screen.

Stuart was having to work hard against the re-organized and high-spirited, northern cavalry. On June 9th, the greatest cavalry battle of the war was fought near Brandy Station. Stuart, with about 10,000 troops was surprised by Pleasonton with about 12,000. There was hard fighting, with classic charges and counter-charges, and the issue was still undecided at sunset when Pleasonton spotted Confederate infantry arriving and prudently withdrew. He had lost 936 men (including 486 captured) to Stuart's 523 but he had given the southern riders due notice that the heady days of the light-hearted "rides around McClellan" were over. Nevertheless, by dint of great effort, the Confederate cavalry succeeded in keeping Ewell's movement covered.

Ewell led his corps up the Shenandoah Valley, capturing a detachment of 4,500 men at Winchester where the gallant, but militarily incompetent, Major-General Robert Milroy had ignored an order to fall back. By 24th June, Ewell's main body was past Hagerstown, and Hill and Longstreet were crossing the Potomac. On 26th, Lee set up his headquarters at Chambersburg. He had heard nothing from

Stuart, which worried him, but he assumed that the silence meant that Hooker was still south of the Potomac. This was not the case. On 26th, Hooker's last day in command, the army was at Frederick, some 40 miles north-west of Washington. At 3.00 am on the morning of 27th, George Meade was wakened out of a deep sleep by a staff officer with the ominous words "General, I'm afraid I've come to make trouble for you." Meade thought he was under arrest and was trying to work out what he had done when he was handed the order giving him command of the Army of the Potomac. As soon as he had recovered from the shock he ordered the army in motion northwards.

On the evening of 28th, Lee learned from a spy that the Union army was not south of the Potomac, as supposed, but close by. As Ewell's entire corps was separated from the main body and was advancing on Harrisburg, this was a potential disaster. He sent messages out immediately, ordering Ewell to head south for either Cashtown or Gettysburg. Unlike his staff, Lee was concerned to hear of Meade's appointment. "General Meade" he said "will commit no blunder on my front and, if

I make one, he will make haste to take advantage of it". Worried as he was about Meade, he was far more concerned about his cavalry commander. "Where" he kept asking, "is General Stuart?"

Stuart had a similar concern. He knew where he was, of course, but he had lost Lee. Not only that, but the entire Union army was between him and where he thought his commander should be. Stuart had set off on a roundabout route that took him through Manassas, north across the Potomac to Rockville (where he captured a wagon-train of supplies) and eventually, in a state of ever-increasing frustration, to Carlisle where he was found by one of Lee's scouts. It is always embarrassing for a cavalry commander to have to have his commander-in-chief's position reported to him and in this case the embarrassment was compounded by the news that Lee was already fighting a full-scale battle some thirty road-miles southward. Stuart set off at once, but his horses were very tired and it was not until the end of the second day of the battle that he finally arrived. His reception was, to say the least, somewhat chilly.



A Bloody Repulse
Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

1st-3rd July, 1863

The three-day battle fought at Gettysburg was not initially intended by either commander. It started when Heth (of Hill's corps) marched towards the town, intending to get shoes for his ill-shod Confederate soldiers from the Gettysburg factory. He ran into Buford with two brigades of cavalry and matters escalated from there. Two Union corps under Howard and Sickles arrived mid-morning and Heth's troops were badly cut up. More Confederate troops marched in and fighting increased. Early, marching down the Harrisburg road caught and routed Howard mid-afternoon and soon the whole Union force was in retreat. Several thousand were captured as they tried to funnel through the Gettysburg streets. Those who escaped capture rallied on Cemetery Hill, named for the cemetery on its summit.

Lee sent a message to Ewell on the left to attack the position if he thought there was a chance of success. This was the sort of message he was accustomed to send to Stonewall Jackson and it would undoubtedly have sent Jackson charging in to dislodge the badly shaken Union troops. But Jackson was two months in his grave and Ewell was uncertain and so did not attack. About 25,000 Confederate and 20,000 Union troops were involved on this first day, with casualties 8,000 and 9,000 respectively (half of the latter being prisoners).

During the night the rest of Meade's army, with the exception of Sedgwick's corps arrived and took up position. Meade was disposed on a curved ridge in the approximate shape of an inverted fish-hook with two hills, Little and Big Round Top, at the "eye". Lee's plan of attack was to feint with Ewell at the barb and attack with Longstreet at the Little Round Top end.

Little Round Top commanded the entire Union position and it was temporarily left uncovered but Brigadier General Warren, the Union army's chief engineer, acted on his own initiative to cover the hill. He was just in time, and a nasty little regimental level fight ensued, but he held on.

Longstreet had no great belief in the attack but he sent it in, from south to north: Hood at 4 pm, McClaws at 5 pm and Anderson at 6 pm. Apart from gobbling up a good proportion of two divisions unwisely posted in a forward salient the attack achieved little, which was unsurprising as by now it was 8 brigades attacking 22 in a solid defensive position. Sedgwick arrived while the attack was in progress and was added to the defense.

At the other end of the line, Johnston and Early attacked at 7 pm and 8 pm respectively. They were not particularly successful either, although Early did manage to effect a lodgement on the point of the hook. By now Meade had his army together and had 80,000 men and 354 guns against Lee's 50,000 and 272.

The morning of the third day saw heavy fighting in the north where Ewell was lodged. The fight swayed to and fro but the Confederate troops were driven off by mid-morning. The main assault was planned for the Union centre. Lee planned to use Pickett's division (about 4,600 men) and Heth's (about the same number but badly cut up on the first day) with a few others to bring the total up to about 11,000. A heavy bombardment started about 1.00 pm which pounded the Union centre for over an hour and a half, but it caused few casualties. At 2.30, the Union batteries ceased fire to make the Confederates think they were knocked out or out of ammunition and the ruse worked. The main attack came in.

The Confederate army advanced in beautifully dressed lines across the three quarters of a mile of open ground. The Union artillery opened fire again and against the massed ranks it was impossible to miss. Some troops did succeed in reaching the Union position and even made a brief breakthrough but they were soon repulsed by the reserve. Barely half of those who set out returned, the attack having cost 5,000 casualties.

Remarkably, Confederate morale was not completely shattered and the army dug in grimly, awaiting Meade's counter-attack. But Meade had just seen the results of attacking an entrenched enemy and he didn't feel like trying it from the opposite point of view. Lee was ultimately able to retreat unmolested.

The battle was one of the bloodiest of the war with a total of over 50,000 casualties, 23,000 Union and 28,000 Confederate. Inside the Gettysburg cemetery was a sign, which had apparently escaped notice: "All persons found using firearms in these grounds will be prosecuted with the utmost rigor of the law."

The battle of Gettysburg, fought on 1st-3rd July 1863, was not destined to be one of Lee's successes. Over-encouraged by tactical successes on the first day when he had out-numbered the Union forces he continued to take the offensive even after Meade's full army

had arrived. The battle reached a climax on the third day with a valiant charge by Pickett's and Heth's divisions which was shattered by Union artillery and the strong Union defensive position. On 4th July, Lee started to withdraw to a position on the rain-swollen

Potomac. Meade was slow to follow up, suspecting a trick or an ambush. He then decided not to follow his enemy directly over South Mountain but to head south to Frederick and then west, and try to catch him at the fords. He reached Middletown, west of Frederick,

on July 9th and then paused again to consider his options.

A planned probing movement on 12th (Sunday) was canceled due to a sudden thunderstorm and, on morning of 14th when he finally advanced, Lee had gone. Meade crossed in pursuit but Lee stayed ahead and crossed the Rappahannock and the Rapidan. By 4th August, the two armies were more or less back where they had started.

THE CENTRE GIVES WAY

For six months after the battle of Stones River, Rosecrans held fast at Murfreesboro, refusing, despite vigorous prodding from Washington, to move until he was ready. This did not happen until June 24th but when he finally got under way, he moved, despite unseasonal heavy rains, with speed and skill. Feinting east and west with Crittenden and Granger he sent his main body straight towards Manchester.

He was fighting in difficult country with many easily defended passes, but a lightning attack by Colonel John Wilder's mounted infantry brigade, using the new, rapid-fire, seven-shot carbines, ploughed through the 1st Kentucky infantry at Hoover's Gap. At a cost of 14 dead and 47 wounded, Rosecrans was now on Hardee's flank with a road open to his rear. Bragg was forced to pull back to his supply base at Tullahoma and prepared to receive Rosecrans' attack.

Rosecrans, however, failed to turn up to the rendezvous. Having reached Manchester on 27th, he turned south-east instead of south-west, moving around Bragg's right flank and threatening the railroad which was his line of supply. This put Bragg in something of a quandary, for the divisions of Granger and McCook were in Shelbyville to his north and could not be ignored. The situation was beginning to look suspiciously like a trap.

Wilder's "Lightning Brigade" had meanwhile been sent ahead to attack the main railroad line. In this he failed, however, due to the fact that six infantry regiments on a train could move faster than a brigade on horseback. He destroyed trestles on two branch lines

but was soon chased off by Forrest's cavalry. Although he failed in his primary purpose, the raid was nevertheless of great importance for it moved Bragg to a decision. He opted to save his army, and retreated across the rain-swollen Tennessee.

In less than two weeks, and at a cost of 570 casualties, of whom less than one hundred were dead, Rosecrans had liberated all of Middle Tennessee and taken over 1600 prisoners.

Even the Confederate newspapers admitted it was brilliant. Rosecrans' superiors were, of course, delighted but could not help thinking that the lack of bloodshed indicated that the whole matter could have been accomplished much earlier. On July 7th, following the fall of Vicksburg and Lee's defeat at Gettysburg, they were already urging him and his "noble army" forward again. Rosecrans, with an army exhausted after trudging across Tennessee in deep mud and on short rations, was exasperated.

"You do not appear to observe" he telegraphed acidly, "the fact that this "noble army" has driven the rebels from Middle Tennessee. I beg in behalf of this army that the War Department may not overlook so great an event because it is not written in letters of blood". Rosecrans was discovering the problems of succeeding beyond expectations.

Regardless, he was underway again on 16th August. Burnside too was underway now that an annoying cavalry raid by Morgan had been captured or driven off. Setting out on 15th August his task was to liberate Knoxville, which objective he achieved with ridiculous ease.

Buckner, his opponent, had pulled out and Burnside entered the town unopposed on 3rd September, thereby cutting the direct rail link between Richmond and Chattanooga. On 9th September he took 2,500 prisoners at the Cumberland Gap and then, hearing that Bragg was in full retreat to the south, decided that it was unnecessary to continue south to support Rosecrans, as ordered.

Rosecrans, however, would have been glad of his support. Initially, everything had gone well. He had relied on his usual tools of thorough preparation, speed and deception and they had not let him down.

The obvious route to Chattanooga lay to the north but Bragg had it well covered. Rosecrans sent three brigades in that direction with orders to light hundreds of bonfires every night, to hammer on barrels and to throw pieces of sawn wood into the river, and generally give the impression that a large force was preparing for an amphibious assault. The deception worked perfectly and Bragg moved extra troops up to cover while Rosecrans crossed the Tennessee at Bridgeport, some fifty miles south, virtually unopposed.

He then split his army into three for speed of movement and to manoeuvre around Bragg. Crittenden was sent directly north to Chattanooga; McCook was sent on a southern detour via Winston Gap; and Thomas (with Rosecrans) punched straight through the middle. Once again, Bragg had been completely out manoeuvred, and was forced to beat a hasty retreat from Chattanooga, which Crittenden took without a fight.

It was here that the normally cautious Rosecrans lost his head. Optimistically believing Confederate "deserters" who were primed with the story that Bragg was completely demoralized and in disarray, he pushed forward. Bragg was no such thing. He was looking for a fight and was hoping to defeat the three widely separated sections of the Union army seriatim. It was a good plan but it was defeated not by Rosecrans, but by delays and disorganization within his own army. Attempts to take first Thomas and then Crittenden failed due to Bragg's orders being misinterpreted or simply disobeyed by subordinates lacking in faith.

Rosecrans soon realized the danger and pulled his forces back behind Missionary Ridge and sent out desperate messages, attempting to re-unite his forces. By the 18th he had succeeded and had deployed his forces east of the ridge near the Rossville gap, some seven or eight miles east of Chattanooga on the banks of the Chickamauga Creek. It was here that one of the bloodiest battles of the war was fought, a battle which was to provide the Confederacy with a much-needed victory after the triple loss of Vicksburg, Gettysburg and Middle Tennessee.

The battle of Chickamauga was one of the few large battles of the war to be

THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA

19th-20th September, 1863

The Chickamauga Creek (chickamauga meaning "stagnant water" or, more sensationally, "river of death") flows approximately north-south into the Tennessee River, a few miles east of Chattanooga, through heavily wooded country. On 18th September the armies of Rosecrans - approximately 65,000 men in three corps under McCook, Thomas and Crittenden - and Bragg - a similar number in five corps divided into two wings under Polk and Longstreet who had just made a long rail journey from Virginia with about 12,000 men.

Bragg had planned to attack on 18th but delays meant that nothing happened, except that Rosecrans shifted his position northward to be nearer the Rossville Gap - his retreat route to Chattanooga in an emergency. On 19th the battle started at the north end of the line when Thomas moved to drive off what he thought was a single brigade. This quickly escalated into a slugging match with both sides pouring in more troops. Fighting spread south in the afternoon when Stewart's division, sent to help against Thomas, accidentally attacked a mile to the south. It hit Van Cleve's division and drove it back almost to Rosecrans' HQ at the Widow Glenn's house. Here, however, they met Reynolds' and Negley's divisions heading north and it was suddenly three divisions to one. Stewart was obliged to retreat back across the north-south, Lafayette Road.

As this attack was failing Hood, without orders, sent in the divisions of Johnson and Law, immediately to the south. These met Davis' division which fell back. Again Widow Glenn's house was in view but again two divisions came to the rescue - this time those of Wood and Sheridan, and Johnson and Law too had to fall back beyond the road. As the sun was setting Cleburne, at the far north end of the line, attacked and drove Thomas back almost a mile but he was still in good order as darkness fell. Throughout the night, the Confederate soldiers could hear their northern counterparts felling trees and hurriedly putting together barricades.

Rosecrans was not displeased with the situation. Although it had been close at times, his line had held together and there seemed to no reason why it should not continue to do so. Bragg also was quite pleased with the way things had gone, despite the unco-ordinated nature of the day's attacks, and he ordered Polk and Hill to attack at dawn. Or rather, he thought he had so ordered, but the messenger could not find Hill in the darkness and by the time everything had been sorted out and the attack finally sent in, it was approaching ten o'clock. Rosecrans' soldiers had not been idle during this period of grace and the breastworks now had a grim and solid look about them. The series of divisional attacks which Bragg had ordered in the north were prosecuted with great enthusiasm but could not break the well-defended line.

The battle might well have continued in this manner until Bragg had worn his army down to nothing had not Rosecrans here made a catastrophic mistake. His aides reported to him a "gaping hole" between Reynolds' and Wood's divisions and, apparently forgetting his own dispositions, Rosecrans sent an order to Wood to "close up and support" Reynolds. Brannan was posted between the two and the only way Wood could support was to go around Brannan, which he did. There he met Thomas who said that Reynolds did not need support - he had just repulsed an attack by Stewart, but sent Wood, on his own (Thomas') responsibility, to reinforce the left. This created the "gaping hole" which had previously had no reality.

Longstreet, meanwhile, had been carefully massing four divisions for an attack and, as Wood's last units were leaving, they went in, leaping over the deserted barricades and charging into the vulnerable Union flanks. The army fell apart, a good third of it routing back to Chattanooga. Rosecrans himself went with them to organize a defence which might well have been necessary had it not been for Thomas.

Thomas, in an action that was to earn him the nickname of "The Rock of Chickamauga", refused to succumb to prevailing panic. Thus Kershaw, rushing in with two Confederate brigades, met with a bloody repulse. The Confederate army gave Thomas everything it had but, re-inforced by two brigades from Granger, who had been in reserve guarding the Rossville Gap, managed to more or less hold on until dark. They were obliged to leave many of the wounded behind and Bragg was to report a total of more than 8,000 prisoners. The Confederate victory had been at a terrible cost, however. Final casualties were 16,170 for the Union and 18,454 for the Confederacy, including in the latter case, 14,674 wounded. For the number of men involved, this was the bloodiest battle of the war.

fought between roughly equal-sized armies. Bragg had been re-inforced by the troops from Knoxville and with two of Longstreet's divisions, brought in by rail on a thousand-mile, variable track ride, necessitated by the loss of Kn-

oxville. About 65,000 men on each side took part. There was little room to manoeuvre in the dense woods around the creek and a two-day slugging match ensued. Rosecrans' position fell apart on the second day when a confusion in

orders left a quarter-mile gap in his line through which Longstreet duly and gratefully charged. Fully one third of the army immediately routed back towards Chattanooga but the Union was saved from total disaster by Tho-

mas who grimly held the left wing together until dark, earning for himself the nickname of "The Rock of Chickamauga".

The victory caused elation across the Confederacy and expectations ran high that Bragg would sweep the invader back across the Tennessee. But it was not that simple. Although Union casualties were high (over 16,000 killed, wounded or missing), Confederate casualties were even greater at over 18,000. Bragg's army was simply in no condition to follow up. Nevertheless, he penned Rosecrans' army in Chattanooga and waited confidently for it to starve or leave.

As he looked down on Chattanooga from the heights of Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, Bragg must have felt confident of the outcome. Its only supply line was a very roundabout wagon route through the mountains - quite inadequate to supply a full army. But Bragg had problems within his own army.

Firstly, his own supply situation, although not menaced by the enemy, was still difficult and it was soon debatable whether the hungriest men were to be found on the ridge or in the town. More serious, however, (from Bragg's point of view anyway) was the running fight he was having with his generals, none of whom were happy with the way he had commanded Chickamauga or the way he was running things now. Bragg was undoubtedly also aware that blame would be cast for the heavy casualties in the battle and he chose Polk for his main scapegoat, relieving him of his command. Things got so bad between Bragg and Dan Hill that Jefferson Davis himself visited on 9th October to try and sort things out. He could not reconcile matters, however, and it came down to a clear choice between Bragg and Hill. It was a hard decision for Davis but he decided against firing the only Confederate commander to win a substantial victory for months and it was Hill who packed his bags.

A scalp-hunt was also underway in the northern camp. Both McCook and Crittenden were relieved of their commands, ostensibly because of their flight in time of danger, although there were mutterings about the fact that Rosecrans had beaten both of them back to the town. Apart from indulging

THE BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA

23rd-25th November, 1863

Holding Missionary Ridge during the siege of Chattanooga, Bragg had an extremely strong position. Grant planned to use Thomas' four divisions in a holding action on the plain in front while Sherman, who had just made a devious detour through the mountains with four divisions, attacked Bragg's right flank along the ridge. Hooker was to attack Lookout Mountain on the left with three divisions and Howard held two divisions in reserve. Bragg was defending with seven divisions, with Cleburne holding the right and Stevenson on Lookout Mountain.

On 23rd November, Thomas was ordered to move out of the city and take up a position half-way across the plain. Thomas' men had heard through the grapevine that Grant had doubts about their morale after Chickamauga and were on their best behaviour. They marched out with the precision of a review and the Confederate outposts on Orchard Knob and Bushy Knob were enjoying the show when suddenly, the trumpets blew and they were swamped in a rush of soldiers.

On 24th, Sherman attacked smoothly on Bragg's right, brushing aside all opposition, until he held the high ground. In late afternoon, contemplating the next day's attack along the ridge, he suddenly realised that he wasn't on the ridge at all. He had been tricked by the unfamiliar terrain and he was on an isolated hill, separated from the main ridge. He dug in, realising that he had everything to do again on the morrow. Meanwhile, Hooker had been attacking Lookout Mountain. On the steep and rocky terrain the two Confederate brigades put up a good showing but against the pressure of three divisions they could only fight a delaying action. During the night they were pulled back to Missionary Ridge by Bragg who felt that they would be more use in the defence there. Thomas did nothing this day.

On 25th, virtually nothing went as Grant planned. In the early morning the American flag could be seen flying on the summit of Lookout Mountain and Grant waited confidently for Hooker to advance on Rossville and Bragg's left wing. He waited some time however, for the terrain was extremely difficult and there was a delay of over four hours while Hooker got into position.

Sherman, at the other end of the line, had run into a wall. Cleburne's single division held off attacks by Sherman's four. Grant sent Howard's two divisions over to help and Cleburne drove them off too. Sherman attacked repeatedly and with vigour but he simply could not budge Cleburne, entrenched on the high ground.

At 3.30 pm with Hooker in position at one end and Sherman stalled at the other Grant looked doubtfully at Bragg's triple line of entrenchments, at the base of the ridge, midway up, and on the crest, and ordered Thomas to take those at the base. Thomas' men were still annoyed that their morale might be called into question and they took the trenches at a rush.

Once there, however, they found themselves subject to plunging fire from the the trenches above. They could not stay there, only go back or forward. A wild spirit caught hold of them and the entire four divisions charged up the steep slope. It couldn't really be done but, aided by Bragg's poor siting of his entrenchments which left large sections of the hill in defilade, they swept over the summit and the Confederate line broke and scattered. Total casualties were 5824 for the North and 6667 for the South, including 4146 captured or missing.



July, 1864. Five Miles to Washington

Early's Division is too little and too late to threaten the defences

in the required blood-letting, Lincoln remained characteristically hard-headed about the whole situation, realizing that the gain of Chattanooga was more important than the loss of Chickamauga and that it must be held. In a brilliant exercise in logistics 20,000 men under Hooker were transferred by rail, along several different railroads, to be in Bridgeport by October 2nd. Sherman was also underway from the west with another five divisions which would lead to the unusual situation of the defenders outnumbering the besiegers.

Rosecrans remained in command for a month but this was only a stay of execution while Lincoln solved the problem of how best to utilize both Thomas, the only Union Corps commander to emerge with any credit from Chickamauga, and Grant, now comparatively idle and underutilized after the fall of Vicksburg. His solution was to create the "Military Division of the Mississippi", comprising the Departments of Cumberland, Ohio and Tennessee, and place Grant in charge. Thomas was given Rosecrans' command of the Army of Tennessee.

Grant arrived in Chattanooga on 23rd October to experience, as it were, Vicksburg in reverse. The supply situation was obviously the first priority. The men were slowly starving on quarter rations and nearly all the animals were dead. Thomas and his chief engineer, W.F. "Baldy" Smith, had not been

wasting their time and an ingenious plan was almost ready to go. Smith had built a small fleet of flat assault boats which could drift silently downstream at night to Brown's Ferry and take the outpost there. The boats could then be converted into a pontoon bridge and a mass of troops could cross and take Raccoon Mountain to the west, opening a line out.

In the early hours of 27th October 1,500 men floated silently downstream on sixty wooden boats, captured the sleepy pickets, and the whole thing went like clockwork. Hooker arrived with an extra two divisions from Bridgeport and "The Cracker Line" was open. On 30th October, one week after Grant's arrival, 40,000 rations were delivered to the grateful troops. As supplies kept flowing in it was clear that Bragg's time was running out.

At the end of November, with Longstreet detached to deal with Burnside around Knoxville, the blow fell. Grant now had Sherman's troops available, as well as Hooker's and Thomas', and he attacked Bragg on Missionary Ridge. Sherman, after a long detour through the mountains, attacked Bragg on his right flank and Hooker attacked his left. Thomas was ordered to demonstrate against the centre. The plan called for Sherman to attack along the line of the ridge but in the event, he was held immobile by Cleburne's single division. Instead it was Thomas' soldiers who, totally without orders, at-

tacked directly up the front of the ridge and cut Bragg's army in half. Grant, who had seen a first class disaster emerging as Thomas' men attacked the "impregnable" ridge, was able to claim a great victory. Bragg retreated successfully towards Atlanta.

At Knoxville, Longstreet fared no better. Burnside had set up an extremely strong defence and none of Longstreet's probes revealed any weakness. On 27th November, hearing the rumour of Bragg's defeat at Chattanooga, he decided that an assault was imperative, both to draw troops away from chasing Bragg and to make his own retreat easier when it came. The assault went in on the morning of 29th but it was an absolute disaster. Having slowly negotiated a field of criss-crossed wire, the attackers came to a nine-foot ditch. As staff officers (reconnoitring at great personal risk through long-range binoculars) had told them it was only five feet deep, no one had thought to bring scaling ladders. Some soldiers attempted to climb up on their comrades' shoulders but it was hopeless. The defenders were massed shoulder to shoulder, artillery raked the trench with enfilading fire, and, when the northern soldiers started heaving lighted shells over the parapet, Longstreet sounded the recall. He had suffered 813 casualties against the Union total of 13.

When Longstreet learned a few days later that Sherman was on the way with six divisions he knew the game was up and headed for Virginia to rejoin Lee. Bragg, meanwhile, had finally run out of credit. He was ordered to hand the command of the Army of Tennessee to Hardee.

MEADE AND LEE *Virginian Pas de Deux*

In the eastern theatre, Meade and Lee spent some months performing a series of manoeuvres, involving much marching and counter-marching, but achieving very little.

Ever since his return from Pennsylvania, Lee had wished to take the offensive against Meade but the detachment of Longstreet to Bragg made this impossible, for it reduced Lee's army to less than 50,000, about half as many as his

THE BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS

5th-6th May, 1864

Fought in the tangle of undergrowth that had overset Joe Hooker, the battle of Wilderness was a total and bloody confusion. Normally steady troops often broke and ran when unexpected attacks broke out of tangled vegetation a bare 20 yards away and on both sides units tended to become mixed, making the transmission of orders difficult.

Three main roads led into the Wilderness from the west and south-west: the Turnpike and Plank Roads from Orange, and the Catharpin Road from Gordonsville. Ewell was ordered to take his corps along the plank road and form a defensive position and wait for Hill, on the Plank Road and Longstreet on the Catharpin to arrive. Longstreet had much farther to travel than the other two.

Ewell deployed successfully and ran into Warren's corps. Initially, Ewell's forward brigade was routed but the attackers were soon outflanked and routed in their turn. Two more blue divisions were surprised and driven off, some fleeing into Confederate lines so completely had they lost their sense of direction. Ewell did not advance beyond his original position and spent the afternoon digging in.

Hill, coming slightly later up the plank road, made heavy contact with Hancock who had been given orders to backtrack from the Catharpin Road to deal with him. The terrain decisively favoured the Confederate defenders but it was still 25,000 versus 7,500 and Hancock would probably have broken through were it not for the fall of darkness.

Both commanders were planning attacks for the following day. Grant was sending Burnside to fill the gap between Warren and Hancock. Warren was to keep Ewell occupied while the main attack went in on Hill. Lee planned to shift Longstreet from the Catharpin Road to the Plank Road and have Hill sidle north to fill the gap. Longstreet's corps was delayed until well after sunrise. Hill's troops, who had neglected to entrench overnight, were pushed back, although in good order, and matters were getting critical when Longstreet's lead brigade finally arrived. By about 10.00 o'clock, the line had been restored.

There was then something of a lull. Grant, at this point, had both flanks exposed and no centre, for Burnside had got himself lost in the tangle and was wandering around in circles with two divisions. Ironically, by having disappeared, Burnside put in an effective defense on the right flank. Gordon, commanding the Confederate far left brigade repeatedly asked permission to attack the open flank but was refused because Burnside was unaccounted for.

On the Union left, not only was Hancock's flank open, but an unfinished railroad cutting led right up to it. Longstreet was not the man to miss such an opportunity and he sent Sorrel with three brigades into the attack. At 11.00 am he exploded into the Union flank with dynamic results. As Hancock said to Longstreet years later "You rolled me up like a wet blanket."

The Confederate units had become terribly mixed-up however and two actually started firing on each other. Longstreet went forward to stop it but was badly wounded and had to be carried from the field. Command went to General Field who spent the next four hours sorting the units back into some sort of order.

At 6.00 pm Gordon finally got permission to attack the Union right when Lee himself came up to investigate. Burnside had by this time found the centre opposite Hill and his phantom flank protection worked no longer. Gordon charged in and started to roll up the flank, but darkness fell before Grant suffered any major disaster.

The following day saw both sides entrenched and very little fighting. Grant had been decisively beaten, losing 17,666 casualties to his opponent's 7,800 and being turned on both flanks. It was a far worse disaster than Hooker had suffered on the same ground. Unlike Hooker, however, Grant managed to avoid defeat by the simple expedient of refusing to acknowledge it. He marched for Spotsylvania and Lee would have to do his work all over again.

opponent. However, when he later learned that Meade had detached two corps to help Grant at Chattanooga, he decided to try and repeat his success against Pope in a similar position the year before.

On 9th October he started his march north and, sure enough, Meade, like Pope, fell back from the constricting "V"

between the Rapidan and the Rappahannock. With the example of Chickamauga to spur them on, the Confederate army marched in high spirits.

Meade, however, did not stop to contest the crossing of the Rappahannock as Pope had done but continued to fall back along the Orange and Alexandria

Railroad. On 14th, A.P. Hill saw what he thought was an opportunity to snare half a Union corps, caught midway across Broad Run and milling in confusion.

Impetuous as always, he sent two of his brigades in at the double but it was a well-laid trap. Warren's corps was hiding behind a railway embankment and

they fired full into the Confederate flank. With misguided instinct the Confederate troops turned and charged their attackers but it was two brigades against three divisions and they were cut to pieces - 1400 killed or wounded and 450 taken prisoner.

Lee continued the pursuit but found that Meade had entrenched in a strong position along the Centerville-Chantilly ridge. With the weather getting ever colder and with an inadequate supply line, Lee's ragged troops were in no condition to remain in the area and on 17th, Lee withdrew. Meade sent his cavalry in pursuit but regretted it when they were ambushed by Jeb Stuart and routed.

Meade himself advanced much more slowly, having to repair the railroad as he came, but by the end of the month he was back on the Rappahannock where Lee had entrenched. It was a strong position, but a sharp night attack on Kelly's Ford successfully turned Lee's position and he was forced back across the Rapidan.

At the end of November, Meade, encouraged by intelligence reports that Lee's army was down to about 40,000 (its actual total was 48,000) against his own 84,000 and by his recent encounters with that army, crossed over the Rapidan into the fringe of the Wilderness area where Hooker had failed so signally seven months previously. Unlike Hooker, Meade employed no deception but relied solely on speed and superior numbers, hoping to catch his enemy unprepared.

There were delays, however, and by the time the first troops arrived at Mine Run they found Lee entrenched behind seven miles of earthworks, with all approaches cleared and covered by overlapping fire. Meade was determined to break the line if he could find a weakness.

When Sedgwick and Warren reported weaknesses on the flanks he ordered a dawn assault by Warren while Sedgwick pounded the opposite end of the line with artillery.

Warren's soldiers were appalled by the prospect, and most sat down to write farewell messages to their loved-ones. Some cynics even wrote their names on pieces of paper, fastened to their clothes with the message "Killed in

action, Nov. 30, 1863". The attack never happened, however. Warren reported to Meade that the attack no longer looked feasible and Meade, coming to see for himself, agreed. Warren's soldiers could be seen walking about with relieved grins, both Warren and Meade having risen substantially in their esteem for having the moral courage to cancel a wrong order. Meade pulled out after sunset on Dec. 1st. Lee had actually ordered an attack for the morning of 2nd but his men charged into a vacuum. Annoyed, Lee set off in pursuit but Meade's head start was enough to take him back across the Rapidan. Both sides moved into camps and prepared to endure the winter.

THE TEN PERCENT SOLUTION

On the first day of 1863 Lincoln had signed the Proclamation of Emancipation. Now, at the end of that same year, in his address to Congress, he announced two more Proclamations.

The first was a declaration of amnesty. He promised full executive pardon to all Confederates - with a few exceptions such as high ranking officers or holders of public office - who were prepared to take an oath of loyalty to the government and support the Emancipation Proclamation, with all the related slavery acts. The second followed from the first and stated that as soon as ten percent of the registered 1860 voters had taken the oath, the state would be readmitted to the Union with full constitutional rights. This would prove in the future to be a very useful mechanism for easing southern states back into the Union.

Reactions were, of course, varied. In the north it mostly received support although few went as far as the Tribune in stating that "no President's message since George Washington ... has given such general satisfaction as that sent to Congress by Abraham Lincoln today." In the south it was somewhat the other way. Jeff Davis was outraged:

"If we will break up our government, dissolve the Confederacy, disband our armies, emancipate our slaves, take an oath of allegiance binding ourselves to him and to disloyalty to our states, he

proposes to pardon us and not to plunder us of anything more than the property already stolen from us ... [he promises] to support with his army one tenth of the people of any state who will attempt to set up a government over the other nine tenths."

Perhaps so, but Lincoln's interest in reconstruction ahead of revenge was by no means universal in the north. It is a measure of his greatness as a statesman that he was prepared to ignore all that had happened if only the Union could be reconstructed. It is also a measure of his shrewdness as a politician that, as a President seeking reelection, he sought to increase his power base with a civilian population presumably happy to have such a painless end to an increasingly painful war.

GRANT IN COMMAND The Boss Takes Over

In February of 1864, Congress passed a bill reviving the rank of lieutenant-general, previously only held by George Washington and Winfield Scott. On 1st March, Lincoln signed the bill and immediately promoted Ulysses S. Grant to the position. On 8th March, Grant arrived in Washington to receive his new commission.

Grant replaced Halleck as general-in-chief and Halleck moved to the new position of "chief of staff". It was here that Halleck's talents were put to full use. His meticulous concern for the details of administration and logistics removed from Grant the burden of paperwork and enabled the general-in-chief to concentrate on overall strategy. His grand strategy was fairly simple. Sherman, who took over command of the armies of the west, would advance on Atlanta, the last Confederate east-west rail-link. Grant, simultaneously, would advance on Richmond. Whoever achieved the objective first would march to join the other for the final kill. And over and above all this, the armies must keep on fighting until, if for no other reason, they would have won by sheer attrition.

This last was what Lincoln had seen from the first and for more than three years he had been looking for what he called a "killer arithmetician". In Grant he had such a man.

The first major problem Grant had to face was that the three-year enlistments were running out. 455 of the 956 volunteer infantry regiments and 81 of the 158 volunteer artillery batteries were due to complete service. The army could not survive the loss of half its volunteer force, and the veteran half at that. Grant therefore decided to appeal to two of man's most basic instincts: greed and pride.

Greed was appealed to in the form of a \$400 bounty, plus whatever the hometown civilians were willing to put up. Pride was utilized on two levels. First, individual pride: the man who re-enlisted would be classified as a "volunteer veteran" and would wear a special chevron. Second, unit pride: any regiment re-enlisting 75% of its former members would retain its organizational status. This latter, of course, put regimental commanders, keen to retain their rank and position, right behind the idea. The plan worked well, and 136,000 men signed up again, although most were in the west where morale was much higher.

Where possible, Grant got rid of commanders who were incompetent or unwilling to fight. Sheridan (who commanded an infantry regiment at Chattanooga) was brought east to command 13,000 troopers of the cavalry division. A bizarre figure with a close-cropped, bullet head, sporting a black moustache and with short legs and long arms (the type, Lincoln remarked "that can scratch his shins without having to stoop over"), he had the aggressive qualities that Grant required and would walk around the camps repeating "Smash 'em up! Smash 'em up!" and hitting his hand with his fist.

Initially, Grant was highly unpopular with the Army of the Potomac. Many of the new recruits were low quality humanity, with numerous bounty jumpers (men who would enlist for the bounty, desert, and then enlist again under another name) and camp discipline had to be tightened. Even more unpopular was his putting an end to prisoner-of-war exchanges. Militarily this was a sound decision, increasing the rate of attrition on the Confederacy and giving it extra mouths to feed, but to the men, many of whom had suffered the starvation rations in the Confederate P.O.W. camps it seemed harsh.

Still, it soon became obvious that Grant meant business. He pulled many backline regiments out of their cushy billets into the front line, including many of the Washington defence units. Even teamsters were taken from their wagons and given Springfields. He had no flair for, or interest in, military polish, although he could often be seen on inspection, and he ignored irrelevancies (for instance, he took no action against soldiers who, disgruntled at being re-organized, wore in a parade their old corps caps with the new ones pinned on the seats of their trousers.) He gave the impression of solidity, unlikely to crack under pressure. As one recruit remarked "We all felt at last that the boss had arrived".

By the beginning of May, "the boss" was ready to move and he sent Sherman a message, letting his subordinate off the leash. The great steam-roller ground slowly into action.

THE FORTY DAYS

On 4th May, the Army of the Potomac, began the now familiar march south. Grant planned to follow the route taken by Hooker and Meade through the wilderness area around Chancellorsville but hoped, by dint of speed, to be out of the tangle before he encountered Lee.

Butler, meanwhile, was ordered to move the Army of the James up the Yorktown peninsula and invest Richmond from the east and south - a move which Grant hoped would distract Lee more than a little.

Things did not quite go according to plan. Like Hooker, Grant failed to clear the Wilderness before he was brought to battle. The three-day encounter was very confused but went heavily against the Union forces.

On the first day, Warren ran into Ewell, pushed him back, was counter-attacked in turn and later, almost outflanked by Hill, who was stopped by Hancock. On the 6th, Hancock pushed forward but was stopped by Longstreet's arrival. About mid-day, an attack by Sorrel broke into Hancock's left flank, but he eventually succeeded in rallying his troops. Burnside spent most of the day lost in the tangle of underbrush but eventually succeeded in finding Hill, who repulsed his attack.

Towards sunset, Gordon's Brigade started rolling up the Union right flank but received inadequate support. The third day was mostly spent digging by both sides.

Despite the confusion, it was clear that Grant had been decisively defeated. He had lost 17,666 casualties to Lee's 7,800 (a ratio as bad as Burnside's at Fredericksburg and with a higher total), he had had both flanks turned (even Hooker had only lost one flank) and his way forward was completely blocked. This was familiar territory to the soldiers of both sides. The next move was for Grant to retreat, a new general to be appointed, the army re-organized and, eventually, the whole dreary process would be repeated again. Sure enough, the army marched out that night but the Union soldiers were surprised (and elated) when, instead of going back, they advanced down the Brock Road, heading for Spotsylvania. This was no Joseph Hooker. This was the killer arithmetician and he was prepared to utilize the grim formula right to the end.

The man probably least surprised by the manoeuvre was the man it was designed to surprise - General Robert E. Lee. "Grant is not going to retreat," he told his subordinates. "He will move his army to Spotsylvania." This apparent reading of his opponent's mind was actually a solid understanding of the strategic realities. If Grant could hold Spotsylvania, he would be between Lee and Richmond and Lee would be obliged to attack him in an entrenched position, leading to almost certain disaster. Lee sent Anderson at the double. He made it in time, but a minute later would have been too late. Fitz Lee's cavalry was attempting to delay the advancing blue column and the attack on their improvised breastwork was actually moving in when Anderson's lead regiment came up, literally at the run, and the attack was narrowly repulsed.

There was fighting at various points throughout the day but the Confederate position held. During skirmishing on the following day, the 9th, Grant lost one of his best subordinates to a sniper. Major-General John Sedgwick, attempting to instil confidence in his troops, came up with his now famous last words: "they couldn't hit an ele-

phant at this distance", just seconds before the bullet penetrated his brain. The 10th and 12th saw hard fighting, particularly around a small salient known to the men as "the mule shoe". On 12th, Hancock made a successful penetration, capturing 3 generals, thirty guns and an entire division of men but that was the sum total of the success. There was sporadic fighting the following week as Grant searched for a weakness but failed to find one. On 20th, he started another flanking movement.

Meanwhile, a number of other Union activities had been rewarded with indifferent success. Sheridan was sent on a cavalry raid on 9th May but his comparative inexperience at handling horsemen meant that little was achieved. He took 300 captives and freed 400 Union prisoners but undoubtedly the best result of the raid (from the Union point of view) was that Jeb Stuart was mortally wounded in a battle at Yellow Tavern. Sheridan reached Butler on the James river on 14th and rested a few days before returning to Grant.

Butler himself had failed totally at his appointed task. Moving his army out against the Richmond defences, he suddenly lost his nerve, ordering everyone back to their original lines. As the Richmond defenses were very undermanned at this time it is likely that a bold advance would have succeeded. A few days later, Beauregard arrived and succeeded in penning Butler into a peninsula formed by a bend in the James.

Sigel was supposed to be moving in the Shenandoah Valley and he was, but unfortunately, in the wrong direction. On 15th May he had met Breckinridge at New Market, had been decisively defeated, and was consequently in retreat back up the valley. The only good thing from Grant's point of view was that it gave him the excuse to relieve Sigel who was replaced by Major General David Hunter.

With Butler bottled, Grant's task became that much harder but he persevered, sending for those of Butler's troops who were not necessary to hold off Beauregard. He started a new turning movement sending Hancock's corps around to the left towards Hannover Junction. The hope was that Lee

would attack this isolated corps and then the rest of the troops could be brought up, forcing Lee to a full-scale battle in the open. Lee declined the gambit, however, and marched south so that when Grant arrived on the North Anna he found Lee entrenched in another strong position.

Here, Lee had set a cunning trap, which Grant did not at first recognize. He had disposed his army in a wedge south of the North Anna, with the apex touching the river at Ox Ford. Wright and Warren crossed upstream and Hancock downstream and they were moving in when they suddenly realized that Lee could fight a holding action on one side of the wedge, moving the bulk of his army to defeat part of Grant's in detail. The Union army started entrenching at a frantic rate. In the event, however, no attack came for Lee has been struck down by an intestinal complaint and had been obliged to take to his cot. Grant disengaged and sidled to the left once more.

There was a brief confrontation near Atlee, with a large cavalry battle, then Grant moved sideways once more to Cold Harbor, where he would link up with Smith's corps from Butler's army, now in the process of landing at White House. Once again however, Lee had read his opponent's mind and he sent Fitz Lee and the cavalry to hold Cold Harbor until the infantry arrived. May 31st saw an all-day cavalry engagement there. Sheridan succeeded in taking the place as night fell but he could see Confederate infantry arriving and he sent a message that he did not think he could hold it. Meade and Grant disagreed and sent back word to hold "at all hazards".

Lee was still stricken by his illness and the subsequent Confederate attack was bungled. By mid-morning,

Wright had arrived with three divisions to relieve Sheridan and the position was held. Lee's army abandoned hope of taking out a portion of Grant's army and once again dug in for defence. On June 1st-3rd Grant launched a series of frontal attacks against Lee's strong position and was bloodily repulsed every time. His losses were in the ratio of about five Union to one Confederate and even Grant could see that this arithmetic was not going to work.

There was a pause while Grant took stock and his critics pointed out that he had reached the same position that McClellan had two years ago, except that Grant had had to pay 50,000 casualties for the privilege. Nevertheless, despite all the defeats and casualties, Grant's plan was essentially working well. His constant pressure on Lee prevented any troops being sent to aid Johnston in front of Atlanta where Sherman was advancing steadily. Furthermore, although Confederate losses were much lower than Union, they had still lost 27,000 men - a full 40% of the army - and two dozen general officers were dead, captured or seriously wounded.

On 12th June, Grant did his last sidle, crossing the James and attempting to come at Richmond from the south through Petersburg. Although Lee suc-



The Victor of Atlanta
William Tecumseh Sherman

ceeded in covering once more, the situation had developed into a siege, the one thing he wished to avoid. As Beauregard had warned a few weeks earlier "The picture presented is one of ultimate starvation."

SHERMAN ON THE MARCH

1. Chattanooga to Atlanta

To oppose Sherman, Joe Johnston was appointed commander of the Confederate Army of Tennessee. Following Bragg, he would undoubtedly have been tolerated whatever his faults but he was an able commander with a real care for his men and he soon became extremely popular.

He commanded two corps under the able Hardee and the aggressive Hood, together with cavalry under Joe Wheeler. Although outnumbered two to one, he was defending terrain most unsuitable for attack and was fairly confident of holding out.

In Sherman, however, he had a skilled opponent. Sherman evolved a plan which he would use again and again on the march to Atlanta. Using the dependable Thomas as the main column, he would send Schofield to the north and McPherson to the south, threatening Johnston's supply lines and forcing him to retreat.

Sherman also had a specially trained unit whose sole job was to repair railroads. As he advanced down the rail line, therefore, he was able to maintain his supply line despite the damage done by the retreating army and by cavalry raiders.

All through May and into the middle of July, Johnston conducted a series of skillfully managed retreats, delaying Sherman as much as possible but always escaping with his army intact. On the whole, there was little serious fighting. Sherman complained that the whole country was "one vast fort, and Johnston must have fifty miles of connected trenches." Still, Johnston had a similar complaint for Sherman moved his large army cautiously, never giving Johnston opportunity for a counter-attack.

The only serious battle was at Kennesaw Mountain on June 27 where Sher-

THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA

22nd July, 1864

In replacing Johnston with Hood, the Confederate High Command expected an aggressive approach to Sherman's advance on Atlanta. In this regard, Hood did not fail to deliver. On July 20th he made a sortie which became known as the Battle of Peachtree Creek. Launched against the rock-steady Thomas, it achieved little but on the following day Wheeler's cavalry reported that McPherson, on the Union left, had neglected to protect his flank. Hood saw an opportunity here for a decisive victory and sent Hardee on a circuitous night-march, with orders to attack the exposed flank at dawn. He withdrew the rest of his troops to Atlanta's inner defences and sent Wheeler to attack Decatur and the Union baggage train.

Things did not go completely according to plan due partly to bad luck and partly to bad management. There were delays in the process of disengagement and it was not until 3 a.m. that the last of Hardee's corps had left the Atlanta entrenchments. The men were also tired after the heavy fighting on 20th and skirmishing on 21st. It was not until noon, therefore, that Hardee arrived at his objective and launched the attack.

The results were variable. Maney's division went in too far to the left and hit an entrenched position. Cleburne, next in line, was much more successful and made a substantial penetration. On the right, however, Bate and Walker ran into an unexpected defence. An entire Union corps, under Dodge, had spent the morning engaged in destroying the railroad to the north and was marching back as Bate and Walker moved forward. They immediately faced left and the column turned into a long defensive line.

McPherson, one of the north's most able generals, was killed in the battle. He was over at headquarters with Sherman when he heard the firing and went across to investigate. He ran into Cleburne's penetration, ignored a call to surrender and was shot down as he tried to ride away. Sherman sent few re-inforcements across, wanting to give McPherson's veterans a chance for revenge.

His faith in them was warranted. There was hard fighting around Bald Hill, held by Leggett but the gallant corps commander Logan took command of McPherson's army and the critical point held. At the end of the day, Hood had nothing to show for his efforts except for 8,000 casualties to Sherman's 3,700. Unlike Johnston, Hood did not fully appreciate that aggression was not necessarily the better part of valour.

man frontally assaulted Johnston's position and was repulsed at a cost of 1,999 casualties to the Confederate 442. Sherman had hoped that Johnston's centre was weak, which it wasn't, but he did not count the attack as a total waste for it had shown Johnston that he was prepared to attack entrenchments and Johnston must therefore keep them well-manned.

By mid-July, after a long, slow waltz across the red-clay country, Sherman was across the Chattahoochee River and only six-miles north of the strong Atlanta defences. Sherman paused to

take stock and was contemplating his difficulties when Jefferson Davis, unsatisfied with Johnston's apparently unaggressive stance, replaced him with Hood. Sherman felt this to be a distinct advantage. He had immense respect for Johnston and was proud of having outmanoeuvred him. Lee had once described Hood as "All lion, none of the fox" and his ill-considered aggression made Sherman's task much easier.

On 20th, as Sherman was pushing towards Atlanta, Hood attacked Thomas on the march at Peachtree Creek but was beaten off at a cost of 4,796 casualties to Thomas' 1,799. On 22nd

FRANKLIN

30th November 1864

After Sherman took Atlanta, Hood obtained permission to launch what was to be a futile expedition into Tennessee. On 28th-29th Schofield, retreating north, had escaped from a trap, largely due to a mix-up of orders on Hood's side. Hood was absolutely furious and it is possible that this warped his judgement.

He arrived at Franklin to find Schofield dug in and in the process of repairing the bridge across the Harpeth River so that he could continue towards Nashville. Two of Hood's seven divisions were still well to the rear, as well as all but eight of his guns, so he had with him about 30,000 men. Schofield was entrenched with 34,000 and 60 guns. Furthermore, there was two miles of open plain before the town. Hood's subordinates were aghast when he ordered a general attack but, in the grand tradition of Ambrose E. Burnside, he refused to listen and at 4.00 o'clock, about one hour before sunset, the attack went in.

Initially the attack went surprisingly well, due to a mistake on the Union side. Wagner had two of his brigades in a forward position across the turnpike, about half a mile in front of the main defences. As Hood's army started forward he neglected to send a message ordering the two brigades to retreat and the colonel's in charge delayed to fire volley's into the approaching enemy. They left their retreat too late and were swamped and routed by the oncoming charge. As they ran back, Cheatham's and Brown's divisions followed in close pursuit and were thus shielded from hostile fire. They broke into the entrenchments and tried to turn the guns there on the defenders but the horses had bolted with the primers. Suddenly, tired from having run half a mile, they found themselves under fire from two dozen guns and when the reserve, under Opdycke, charged in, they were forced to fall back and try to find cover outside the works.

This was the high point of the attack. French, Walthall and Loring, attacking the Union left, were caught in heavy fire from across the river from Fort Granger and from masked batteries, and in small arms fire from entrenched troops armed with repeating rifles. At 7.00 pm, an hour after full darkness, Hood committed the reserves but although fighting went on until 9.00 o'clock nothing was achieved.

Schofield retreated during the night and Hood had wrecked his army. Six generals were killed, including the highly competent Cleburne, one captured and five badly wounded. 6,252 veterans were casualties, including 1,750 dead. Schofield had suffered 2,326 casualties and was falling back on re-inforcements. Hood continued the pursuit to Nashville, to lose heavily in a battle with Thomas on 15th December, but essentially, any hope of a successful campaign ended here at Franklin.

he cleverly turned McPherson's left flank using Hardee's corps in a movement which would probably have won the battle in the first years of the war but Sherman's veteran army refused to panic and the attack was eventually beaten off. Hood lost around 10,000 men in this encounter which, out of an army of 40,000, was far beyond what he could afford. Sherman wrote back to his wife "I am glad when the enemy attacks, for the advantage then is with

us." This was not apparent to Hood, however, for on 28th he attacked again, this time losing 5,000 casualties to an approximate 600 inflicted. After this, Hood finally got the message and retired behind his siege works.

Sherman had no intention of attacking him, however. He attempted to cut Hood's communications with his cavalry and, when that failed, he cut loose from his base and used the army to do the job. Hood was obliged to evacuate

the city on 1st September and it was occupied by Sherman on 2nd. Sherman prepared for his raid to the coast by destroying the enemy's potential base behind him. On 7th September he ordered the city evacuated, deaf to any protests. "War is cruelty," he said "and you cannot refine it."

2. Hood Heads North

Following the loss of Atlanta, Hood received permission from Davis to move west and attack Sherman's communications. Sherman wasted some time trying to pin the elusive army down but eventually reverted to his original plan for the massive raid across Georgia, leaving Thomas to deal with the defense of Tennessee.

On 21st November, Hood crossed the Alabama/Tennessee border and on 27th he made contact with Schofield and about 30,000 men at Columbia. Hood turned his position and Schofield was rather casual about his retreat, leaving himself wide open to attack. Hood was fully aware of this but, for reasons that are still unclear, his order to attack was never carried out and Schofield escaped to his prepared fortifications at Franklin.

There, on 30th November, the impetuous Hood launched a series of badly coordinated attacks, not waiting for his artillery to arrive. It was a dreadfully botched job and although charges continued to go in until 9.00 pm they had no effect whatsoever. Schofield retired during the night towards the safety of Nashville, some twenty-five miles north. Union casualties had been 2,326. Hood had lost 6,252 including five generals killed, one captured and six wounded.

Hood followed on to Nashville but his position was becoming hopeless. Thomas, in command, now had 55,000 men behind strong fortifications. Hood also dug in but he was ill-equipped to cope with the freezing weather and the army's morale was dropping daily. Thomas would have been quite happy to wait until the Confederates froze solid but pressure from Washington forced him to attack. On 15th December he moved, turning the Confederate left flank which crumbled towards sunset and Hood's army was pushed back about two miles. The next day, following a two-hour artillery bombard-

ment, Thomas attacked again. Several assaults were repulsed but in mid-afternoon the left was penetrated and the position broke apart. Hood had lost 1,500 killed and 4,500 captured.

Hood managed to get the remnants of his army back to Tupelo, Mississippi, but the last Confederate offensive was over.

3. Marching Through Georgia

On 12th November, Sherman marched towards the Atlantic coast from Atlanta. Or rather, from where Atlanta had been, for on his departure he burned the city to the ground. He aimed his march between Macon and Augusta, leaving his opponents unclear as to his objective. In fact, he went for neither city. His objective was the Confederate economy and he concentrated his work of destruction upon the railroads and the farms.

The Confederacy attempted to raise a force to stop him but the motley collection of fragmented units and over-aged reserves came to no more than 14,000 effectives - pitiful when compared with Sherman's 62,000 veterans. Bragg, for once, summed up the situation well: "I must candidly express my belief that no practicable combinations of my available men can avert disaster."

The march was in two large columns under Howard and Slocum and by the time Savannah had been reached on 10th December the destruction had been tremendous. Over 200 miles of railroad had been destroyed and the rails heated on burning cross-ties and twisted into "Sherman neckties". Apart from the hard work this entailed the expedition was regarded by the army as a sort of holiday. They dined well on what was taken from the farms and what could not be eaten was killed or burnt. About 10,000 slaves were freed or deserted. Sherman estimated damage at \$100,000,000 about one fifth of which was "inured to our advantage" and "the remainder is simple waste and destruction."

The expedition was even commemorated in song:

"How the darkies shouted when the heard the joyful sound,

How the turkeys gobbled which our commissary found,

How the sweet potatoes even started from the ground,

As we marched through Georgia."

Savannah could not attempt to hold out against Sherman's force and the 10,000 garrison troops escaped on a pontoon bridge. Sherman, in high spirits, sent Lincoln the following message:

"I beg to present you, as a Christmas gift, the city of Savannah, with 150 heavy guns and plenty of ammunition; also about 25,000 bales of cotton"

THE ROAD TO APPOMATTOX

The strangulation "anaconda" policy, first proposed by Winfield Scott at the very beginning of the war, was moving into its final phase and the Confederacy was being crushed in its coils. In the final three months of the war, with superior forces in all Departments, Grant could do virtually as he wished. The Atlantic port of Wilmington was still open and blockade runners were still getting a trickle of supplies through to Richmond via the railway. Fort Fisher, at the mouth of the estuary, was taken on 15th January, by a heavy bombardment. Grant then ordered Schofield and his 20,000 strong Army of the Ohio to North Carolina to take Wilmington. The capture of Fort Fisher had closed the port to the blockade runners but Grant wanted the port itself in Union hands. The other reason for moving Schofield was that he would

be able to re-inforce Sherman if Lee tried to use his interior lines and attack him. Wilmington was taken without opposition on 22nd February.

Sherman had not waited long at Savannah and was soon on the march again, despite the dreadful winter weather. Hardee and Beauregard still had armies but by concealing his objectives Sherman managed to evade them, although it is unlikely that either could have done more than slow him down. Stopping overnight in a cold, deserted mansion he added his personal mite to the general destruction by feeding the bedstead into the fireplace.

Columbia, taken on 17th February, lost rather more than an old bedstead as two-thirds of it was burned down, although it must be said that Sherman's men acted here on their own initiative and Sherman did his best to put out the flames.

On the principle that changing navigators might stop the ship sinking, the Confederacy shuffled commanders and Joe Johnston took command of all the forces in North Carolina. Lee, the miracle man, was appointed general-in-chief of the armed forces, which might have done some good in 1862 but was by now no more than a gesture. In any case, Davis had been following Lee's advice throughout the war.

Never the man to do a double overkill when a triple was available, Grant ordered further raids to break up what was left of the Confederate army and economy. Stoneman was ordered to



Richmond Ablaze

Confederate forces burn supplies before abandoning their capital

conduct a cavalry raid into East Tennessee from Knoxville. Wilson, with 12,500 troopers was ordered into Alabama where Nathan Bedford Forrest was still on the loose. Canby with 38,000 infantry was ordered to take Mobile and move into Alabama. Due to delays, neither of the cavalry raids got underway until March and Canby was still besieging Mobile in April but the lack of these supporting movements made little difference to Sherman. Johnston really had no chance. He did his best, with gadfly attacks but he was outnumbered, and his troops outclassed, by what was probably now the finest army in the world.

About the only thing that served to raise Confederate morale was a cavalry battle in South Carolina where the Union Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick was surprised while asleep and nearly captured. Like a lover surprised by the returning husband he leapt out of bed and fled without even bothering to put on his trousers. His poise unshattered, the resourceful general then succeeded in rallying his troops and the attack was finally beaten off, ending what became known as "the Battle of Kilpatrick's Pants".

Arriving at Fayetteville, North Carolina, on 11th March, Sherman reported "the utter demolition of the railroad system of South Carolina, and the utter destruction of the enemy's arsenals at Columbia, Cheraw and Fayetteville." At Goldsboro, on 23rd March, he paused to rest his army and see the railroad to the coast repaired. At the end of the month he visited Grant at Petersburg to plan the final movements.

Inside the Richmond fortifications, Lee's army had been slowly starving, with rations down to a pint of cornmeal per day and sometimes "a piece of bacon large enough to grease your palate." Morale plummeted and between 15th February and 18th March, almost eight percent of the army deserted. Grant did little throughout the siege, except to extend his line southward, stretching Lee's already thin resources.

On 25th March, Lee attempted a breakout at Fort Stedman but, despite some initial penetration, the debilitated and outnumbered attackers were soon driven off with heavy losses. It is a reflection on the relative states of the

two armies that the Union forces carried on quite calmly with a review before Grant and Lincoln, just behind where the attack came in. An all-out attack by the once-feared Army of Virginia was brushed off as an irrelevancy.

On 1st April, Sheridan broke the Southside Railroad, defeating Pickett in the Battle of Five Forks. He was now at Lee's rear, with Lee's last supply line - the Richmond and Danville Railroad - his for the taking. Lee ordered the immediate evacuation of Richmond. President Davis and such gold as was still left in the treasury were loaded aboard a special train and sent south.

Lee's last chance was to link his army with Johnston's. He set off along the line of the Appomattox River, seeking a point at which he could turn south. But Grant kept his army moving in parallel and it was impossible. Besides, the men had had enough. Personal loyalty kept Lee's veterans with him but they knew the Confederacy was finished. One of Longstreet's veterans put it rather well:

"My shoes are gone; my clothes are almost gone. I'm weary, I'm sick, I'm hungry. My family has been killed or scattered, and may now be wandering helpless and unprotected. I would die; yes, I would die willingly because I love my country. But if this war is ever over, I'll be damned if I ever love another country!"

By the time they reached the Appomattox Court House, Grant had succeeded in pushing men in front of the retreating army and Lee knew the end had come. On 9th April, down to 12,500 men, he surrendered.

RECONSTRUCTION

Grant's terms to Lee were generous and set the pattern for further surrenders by other Confederate armies. The criti-



The Aftermath of War

The Richmond & Petersburg Railroad Station

cal phrase read "each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside." Effectively, this was immunity from prosecution for war activities, which was even more generous than Lincoln's earlier proclamation of amnesty which had held no such guarantee for high-ranking officers. Not included in the terms, but allowed by Grant anyway, men who owned horses were permitted to take them home for use on their farms. Such terms made it much easier for other commanders to surrender over the next few weeks.

Such a promising start was shattered five days later by a bullet, fired at Ford's Theatre in Washington by one John Wilkes Booth, which took the life of Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln was probably the one man in America with the insight, the moral courage and the political strength to deal with all the problems of a post-war reconstruction.

Edmund Ruffin, the man who fired the first shot at Fort Sumpter, refused to live under the "perfidious, malignant and vile Yankee race" and put a bullet through his brain. Few went to these lengths but many shared his feelings.

The negro was emancipated but there were no powerful persons to look after his interests and many ended-up share-cropping on their old plantations. Even in the north, most regarded the negro as an inferior species of humanity. In the south, prejudice was

worse. In 1866, the first Ku Klux Klan meeting was held and it grew rapidly, appointing General Nathan Bedford Forrest as "Grand Wizard". Apart from its sheer nastiness it was used as a political tool by conservative leaders to drive a wedge between white and black.

In 1868 Grant was elected President. He was a classic example of the "Peter Principle" in action - a man promoted completely beyond his level of competence. As a general he had engineered northern victory. As a President he was lost, and unscrupulous subordinates took over. The administration was shot through with corruption and the weakened south was exploited to the full.

Overall, the war had cost over 600,000 lives and had wounded another 400,000. Two million men had served in the armed forces. Uncounted millions of dollars had been spent on these armies and further uncounted millions of dollars worth of property had been destroyed. A complete way of life in the southern states had vanished utterly. What could be shown on the other side of the balance sheet?

Slaves, of course, had gained even if in many cases the initial gains were small. Military expertise, for those who count such to be a gain, had leapt forward with new tactics and weapons, although it would be twenty years before the armies of Europe caught up. The main result, however, was that which for Lincoln had been the driving force all along - the Union had been preserved and has not since been seriously challenged. It is notable that documents after the war tend to replace the phrase "The United States are" with "The United States is".

For the common soldier, caught up in the whirlwind, perhaps the most important thing was that the war was over. As one veteran put it "I've killed as many of them as they have of me. I'm going home." ♦

Continued from p.29

honestly say that SSG designs and publishes the best historical simulations available in the market today. They are state of the art and excellent representations of the battles as they

occurred. You can quote me on that statement anytime you like.

Take care and keep in touch.

Richard Mataka
Staten Island, NY.
USA

Dear Sirs,

I recently purchased *Reach for the Stars* for the Mac. I had owned the first edition for the Apple II several years ago. Wow, what an improvement! Especially the Advanced Scenario. Absolutely fantastic. I became a fan of SSG early on. I guess that's obvious since I bought your first game. I had most of Roger Keating's SSI games already, so I naturally was interested in your company from the start.

The first RFTS was good. *Carriers at War* blew *Carrier Force* out of the water. Then everyone had to have a strategic bombing game like *Europe Ablaze*. Well, as much as I love SSI's offerings, I'd like to see SSG beat them at something else. MORE MAC WAR GAMES!!!!!!

I've written and called them repeatedly about Mac software, but they don't think it sells very well. But their best stuff isn't available. *Computer Ambush* and *North Atlantic '86* are fine, but they're no *Kampfgruppe*. Also their Mac conversions are not as easy to use as a Mac program should be. Yours is about the best conversion I've seen for taking advantage of the Mac interface. Plus they won't advertise in *MacUser* and *Mac World*. I wonder why the sales suffer. Let's see some strategic simulations up there with *Falcon*, *Flight Simulator*, *Hardball*, etc.

Almost all Mac owners I know used to have Apples, so we're the same people that bought them before. From what the Designer's Notes say you are going to be more intelligent. I hope so. I'll buy everything you can put out. I owned your first three games, but have never played your land battle games. I'm sure the same quality is there, though. More conversions, quick!

Oh well, enough stroking. I have a few questions about *RFTS* and minor complaints about the manual.

Do PDBs assume your tech level in the advanced game as in the basic game? Is tech level III still the maximum?

Is there any way to pick up garrison troops once landed? Sometimes the opposing armies fold up much easier than expected and one is left with too many garrison troops, unnecessarily eating up the already limited RPs on conquered worlds. There seems to be no way out. Shouldn't you be able to build transports up to the number of garrison armies? One can build all other classes of ships.

It would be nice if the Full Map could be scrolled. I can picture the wrap-around but it would be easier to judge distance if one could scroll the map around.

It would seem to be better if there was an interlock between the end turn button and the end production button. When I first started I often finished production only to hit the wrong button. An "Are you sure?" window could appear only if one pushed the end turn button without first ending production.

As great as this game is, the handbook is a little weak. I'm glad I had played the game before. I guess it's hard to write for the novice when you've been around the game for years. There is no mention of the overpopulation problem in the basic game except on the Errata sheet, and then it really only refers to the advanced game. One likely wouldn't even find this comment until you had played the basic game several times. There is no explanation of what the effects may be. Riots are mentioned but no potential causes.

Thanks for listening, and thanks in advance for your answers to my questions. Keep up the great work.

Barry C. McCaslin
Falmouth ME,
USA

Gentlemen,

Please sign me up for a one-year subscription to *Run 5* with the disks. I have enclosed a check for \$65. I have an Apple IIc.

How about a scenario of Custer's Last Stand or the Alamo. Maybe too blood-thirsty for general consumption.

I am really enjoying your games. Please keep up the good work!

David Schell
McLean, Virginia.
USA

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HALLS OF MONTEZUMA

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United States Marine Corps



Roger Keating
Ian Trout
Andrew Taubman
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Halls of Montezuma

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AUGUST 20, 2087

Nothing could be worse than this god-forsaken, radioactive desert.

More Sniperdroids! All tracking me with them death glares. And them Uzis. They're weird trigger-twitchin' folks. I suspect it's them poisoning the water.

Or maybe it's those Leather Thugs. Heck, I don't know anymore. I heard they have a bunch of civilians cut off east of Ranger Center, which is where I'm headed. Hope not. They want me dead. Like every other mutant this side of Vegas.

The worst part is, I'm getting to be as bad as they are. You wouldn't believe some of the ways I've learned to kill. I hang out in sewers, and my best friend is a MAC 17 submachine gun.

Gramps talked about life before the nuclear war. All I know is I don't want others living this way. Gotta rebuild this desert right. Gotta make it so you can sleep with your eyes closed.

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